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I.
1.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in concluding that the

zoning ordinance of Clearfield City was invalid and had been
unconstitutionally applied by holding that the ordinance requires,
in cases involving zoning conditional use permits, an initial
determination by the Clearfield City Planning Commission with an
appeal to the Clearfield City Council rather than to the Clearfield
City Board of Adjustment?
2.

Does equity and justice require that this Court grant the

Petition in this case until at least such time as it has considered
the requests for rehearing in a case primarily relied upon by the
Court of Appeals?
3.

Did the Court of Appeals err in failing to address the

contention of Petitioner that it had legitimately denied a
conditional use permit to the Respondent on the basis that
governmental planning allowed the separation of mental health
facilities rather than clustering them in one location?
II.

REFERENCE TO OPINION

The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is presently
contained in 82 Utah Adv. Rptr. 38 (May 13, 1988).
III.

JURISDICTION REQUIREMENTS

1.

The decision by the Court of Appeals was filed on May 13,

2.

An extension of time to file this Petition for Certiorari

1988.

was granted by a justice of this Court on June 13, 1988 allowing
this Petition to be filed on or before July 12, 1988.
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3.

Section 78-2-2 authorizes review by this Court of

judgments of the Court of Appeals; Rule 42 of the Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court provide that the review of a judgment of the Court of
Appeals shall be initiated by a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the Supreme Court of Utah.
IV.

CONTROLLING STATUTES AND ORDINANCES

Various sections of Title 10, Chapter 9, Article 1 and Article
2 of the Utah Code Annotated are applicable to this Petition.

A

copy of Chapter 9, Article 1 and Article 2 are contained in the
Appendix to this Petition.

In addition, Chapter 2 and Chapter 12

of the Clearfield City Ordinances as of July of 1984 are also
contained in the Appendix attached herein.
V.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

On June 25, 1984 Respondent Davis County made application with
Petitioner Clearfield City for a conditional use permit to operate
a "Residential Treatment Program for Adolescents and Adults
Experiencing Substance Abuse and Mental Illness." A hearing was
held on July 18, 1984 before the Clearfield City Planning
Commission.

The Commission in a three-to-one vote denied the

application.

Subsequently, in accordance with the Clearfield City

Ordinance then in effect, Respondent appealed to the Clearfield
City Council.
A public meeting was held on September 11, 1984 and was then
continued until October 9, 1984.

The City Council voted to uphold

the decision of the Planning Commission to deny the conditional use
permit.
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Suit was commenced in the District Court of Davis County on
November 7, 1984 alleging that the actions of the Clearfield City
Council and its Planning Commission were both unconstitutional and
arbitrary and capricious.
The matter was tried to the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby on
April 24 and April 25 of 1986.

The District Court issued a

Memorandum Decision on May 28, 1986 ruling in favor of the
plaintiff and ordering that a Writ of Mandamus be issued requiring
Clearfield City to issue a conditional use permit.

Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law were signed on May 28, 1986.
Thereafter, Petitioner's request for a stay of execution was denied
and Petitioner Clearfield City subsequently filed a Notice of
Appeal on July 23, 1986.
The appeal was originally docketed in this Court (No.
86-0343).

Later, however, this Court ordered the case poured-over

to the newly created Utah Court of Appeals (No. 860343-CA).
The parties orally argued this matter before a three-judge
panel of the Court of Appeals and on May 13, 1988 a decision of the
Court of Appeals was rendered affirming the decision of the lower
court.

It is from this decision that the present Petition for

Certiorari is taken.
B.

Statement of Facts

In the opening brief of Petitioner a 19-page Statement of
Facts was presented to the Court of Appeals.

Since the majority of

this material goes to the merits of the decision made by the
petitioner it can be briefly restated for purposes of this
Petition.

It should be observed, however, that there were two
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forums in which the lower court record was established.

First,

extensive verbatim recordings of the proceedings in the Planning
Commission and City Council were entered as evidence.

Second, the

lower court took additional testimony of witnesses in a hearing in
which numerous witnesses were called upon to testify.
In 1981 Davis County through its Executive Director of the
Davis County Mental Health Department applied for a conditional use
permit to allow the construction of a facility known as the
Addiction Recovery Center (ADC).

At this time the Director

represented to the Planning Commission that he had no reason nor
any intention to request any other similar facilities in the same
area (Lower Court Transcript 323; hereinafter Tr.).
The ARC was constructed in 1981 and presently treats adults
who are experiencing or recovering from chemical addiction.
72).

(Tr.

At the time relevant to this appeal the area in which the ARC

facility is located was zoned PO which stands for a Professional
Office Zone.

(Tr.

137, 101-102).

In the summer of 1984 the

respondent made an application for a new facility which was
proposed to be located next to the existing facility.

This new

proposed facility was to be used "as a residential treatment
program for adolescents and adults experiencing substance abuse and
mental illness." (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 ) . The existing Clearfield
City Ordinances at the time (Chapter 12) did not allow this type of
use as a "permitted use" but did allow a convalescent service to be
occupied in the zone if a "conditional use permit" had been
approved by the Planning Commission.
Clearfield City Ordinances).
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(11-12-1 through 11-12-5

On July 18, 1984 a hearing was held before the Clearfield City
Planning Commission,

At that time various proponents and opponents

of the facility testified before the Commission.

The Executive

Director of Davis County Mental Health extensively discussed the
need for the facility and how it would impact upon the area as well
as contribute to the general well being of the community.
22).

(Tr.

Many of the people in attendance at the meeting stated their

opposition to the new facility on the basis that they did not want
a second facility located next to the first one, that they were
fearful about dangers of the type of people located in the
facility, as well as several other concerns.
Wilford Summerkorn testified that he was employed by Davis
County but was also the Clearfield City Planner under a contract
arrangement between the County and the City.

(Tr. 98-99) . He had

prepared a report for the Planning Commission after investigating
the application of the County.

A portion of that report stated the

following:
A question that has been raised by some is the
appropriateness of having two such facilities located so
close together. Land uses of this type are often viewed
as being somewhat undesirable for a variety of reasons,
most of them personal reasons of homeowners in their
vicinity. Undesirable land uses can be located in
communities in one of two ways: they can be grouped
together to minimize the impact on other areas of the
community, though they may then more severely impact the
area they are located in, or they may be spread
throughout the city to lessen the impact in any one
location and "share the wealth" so to speak.
The only guide or precedence that Clearfield may
have as to what policy to follow would be the regulation
for residential facilities for the handicapped.
Handicap facilities and mental health facilities are far
from identical, but some of the impacts may be similar.
Clearfield's regulations for the handicap facilities
require that no two facilities be located closer than
-5-

one mile from each other. This, then, tends to follow
the idea of disbursing such facilities throughout the
community rather than concentrating them. (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 17).
At the conclusion of the meeting a vote was taken with three
members voting to deny the permit and one member voting in favor of
it.

(Tr. 303-07).
After the meeting the Davis County Mental Health Department

requested the City to specifically list why the Zoning Commission
had denied the conditional use application.

No response was

received from the Zoning Commission (Tr. 34-35).

There was no

statutory requirement that such response be made.
Subsequently, on September 11, 1984 a meeting was held before
the City Council to appeal the denial of the permit by the Planning
and Zoning Commission.

Much of the same discussion that had

previously occurred was repeated in the City Council meeting.

In

one instance, however, Shirley Reed, a councilwoman for Clearfield
City who had previously attended the Planning Commission hearing
and who had performed additional independent research as to the
question of locating two facilities adjacent or apart, spoke
concerning a report from the American Planning Association entitled
"The Effect of Group Care Facilities on Property Values."
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 10; Plaintiffs Exhibit 18; Tr.

163). She

stated in her opinion that these studies showed that concentrated
density of group homes had an impact on the characterization of
property and their value and that it was generally recommended that
city planners look at disbursing the facilities rather than putting
them in a cluster area.

While there were six studies contained in

the report, Mrs. Reed focused upon one particular study done in
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Oakland, California in 1983 which involved the type of group home
nearly identical to that proposed by Davis County namely persons
with mental health problems, alcohol problems and drug problems.
This study, according to the report, showed that grouping these
type of facilities together had an adverse effect upon the
surrounding area as well as causing a marked decline in property
values.
Don W. Baird, the City Manager of Clearfield, with a master's
degree in public administration told the Council that in his
opinion the decision could go either way since valid arguments
could be presented as to both positions.

(Tr. 223).

At the conclusion of the meeting it was decided to table the
resolution and to continue it to a further meeting.

Mr. Baird was

directed by the Council to make a study of the area as to other
social services being provided in Clearfield City as well as to
gather more information about the proposed Davis County facility.
(Tr. 204, 329).
Between September 11 and October 9 Mr. Baird conducted various
studies and made various inquiries concerning the location of this
facility.

On October 9, 1984 the City Council met as they

customarily did one hour prior to the beginning of the public
hearing.

At that time Mr. Baird briefly showed the Council some of

the exhibits he had prepared.

There was no discussion as to how

any member felt about the facility in light of this information.
(Tr. 345).
Shortly thereafter the public portion of the meeting began at
which time various members again spoke concerning the location of

-7-

the facility.

Councilwoman Reed again stated her concern about the

placement of the facility next to the adjoining facility and said
that she believed Clearfield had been responsive to the community's
and the county's special needs by the establishment of numerous
facilities.

During the meeting as contained in a verbatim

transcript Councilwoman Reed stated:
As an elected official I feel that it is my
responsibility in upholding the master plan and of those
planning ordinances, just as I would carefully consider
say three Artie Circles being in the very same area.
This would not be good to the original businesses. And
I feel that from my charter that an elected official is
to minimize the impact of the changes to the
characteristics of that particular neighborhood and I
feel that another residential group care facility at
this particular location at 904 South State Street would
actually maximize the impact rather than minimize it.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 13, p. 3 ) .
Another councilman stated a similar concern.

He said:

I am against two of them being right together and
taking up 11% of the ground. I am against that and I
don't think that we, and I don't know how you feel, that
we should be stimied with or have that put on us that we
are against that type of facility and I think it needs
to be done and should be done but I don't think there
should be two of them together. (Plaintiff's Exhibit
13, p. 10).
A vote was subsequently taken at which time the Council voted
to uphold the decision of the Planning Commission and to deny the
conditional use permit.

The minutes of the meeting reflect three

reasons why the permit was denied.

First, that Clearfield City had

been responsive to the needs of these types of persons by
supporting four other facilities in the community all within less
than a one-mile radius; second, even the most favorable studies of
group care facilities indicated that facilities should be disbursed
to lessen the impact to property owners and since a staff survey
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indicated 11% of the survey area would be dedicated to group care
facilities this would result in too high of a density for this
particular location and; third, as elected officials it was the
responsibility of the Council to insure the characteristics of the
neighborhood was minimized and that this new facility would
maximize the impact on the existing homes, churches and schools.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 11, p. 2 ) .
After the vote the Council instructed Mr, Baird to find
alternative sites for this type of facility (Tr. 287) .

Later Mr.

Baird gave to the Davis County Health Administrator a map showing
three possible sites in which such a facility would be approved.
(Tr. 249-51).

These proposed sites included areas in a residential

zone since a new zoning ordinance which had just gone into effect
permitted these type of facilities as a conditional use in any
residential zone within the city.

(Tr. 247-49).

Later, two of these three sites were approved by the City for
other facilities not owned by Davis County Mental Health but which
supported similar types of programs.

(Tr. 251-52).

After listening to the testimony of the witnesses and
reviewing the verbatim transcripts of what occurred during the
various meetings the lower court judge granted the County's request
for a Writ of Mandamus essentially finding that there was no valid
reason for denying the application to permit this facility in the
proposed location.

A copy of the Memorandum Decision of the lower

court together with its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law is
attached hereto to the Appendix.

The court not only found the

decision of the City to be arbitrary and capricious but also found
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it to have unconstitutionally applied Section 11 of Chapter 12 of
the Clearfield Zoning Ordinance in violation of Section 7 and
Section 24 of Article I of the Utah Constitution and of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower
court concluding that there was no evidence to support the City's
decision and that "public clamor" had improperly influenced the
City in denying the permit.

A copy of the Court of Appeals

decision is contained in the Appendix herein and will be
extensively discussed in the next section of this Petition*
VI.

ARGUMENT FOR THE ISSUANCE OF WRIT

A litigant in a court of law is painfully aware that a
decision may be rendered against him regardless of his own beliefs
as to justice and equity.

Lawyers routinely instruct their clients

that an appellate court may well find against the client on factual
matters or on legal arguments presented.

Litigants and lawyers are

both prepared for adversity in this regard.

However, fundamental

justice and procedure require that the parties be given an
opportunity to effectively argue issues which are deemed by the
court to be controlling.

In addition, those central issues

disputed by the parties should be addressed by the court in order
that a resolution of the issue may be made.
In the instant case the Court of Appeals failed in both of
these respects.

First, the court on its own motion wrote an

opinion based upon the alleged infirmity of the Clearfield City
Ordinances and upon the standards of judicial review.

If the

briefs in this case are examined by this Court it is obvious that
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neither the statutory appeal structure nor the applicable standard
of judicial review was discussed by either party except in passing.
It was not until oral argument that these highly important
questions were raised by questions from the bench.
Second, the Court of Appeals failed to address the issue which
was central to the arguments contained in the briefs namely whether
the decision of the City to prohibit two facilities together was
arbitrary and capricious or unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeals

in its opinion has cited numerous reasons claimed by the City to
justify the denial of the permit except the primary reason of
adjacent properties: the main and critical issue raised by the
parties below.
Thus, the Court of Appeals in its opinion not only established
extremely critical law with no input from the parties but also
completely ignored the arguments which were the center of the
appeal.

Since the issues addressed by the court on its own

initiative are extremely important to cities and municipalities
throughout Utah these "additions" have far more impact upon
Clearfield City and other cities than simply whether a mental
health facility should be allowed.

Thus, not only are there

meritorious reasons for this Court to review the decision of the
Court of Appeals based upon the substance of the arguments but
there is also reason for review because of the procedural infirmity
below.
A.

A Writ of Certiorari Should be Granted
By This Court Since the Decision of the
Court of Appeals Has Decided an Important
Question of Municipal Law Which Has Not Been,
But Should be, Settled by This Court and
Which Substantially Affects All Municipalities
-11-

and Cities in Utah,
The decision of the Court of Appeals substantially affects
nearly all small cities and municipalities in Utah*

As noted in a

bulletin of the Utah Chapter of the American Planning Association,
an organization of city and county administrators: "With a quick
one-two punch, the state's top courts last month demolished the
appeals process used by many Utah cities in administration of their
zoning ordinances."

A copy of the Utah APA planner is contained

herein in the Appendix.
Essentially, the decision of the Court of Appeals has held
that in cases involving conditional use permits it is required that
any aggrieved litigant from the Planning and Zoning Commission must
appeal such decision to the Board of Adjustment.

While this Court

has recently decided a case involving historic permits it has yet
to decide any case involving a conditional use permit.
All cities and municipalities now contain provisions in their
codes allowing certain uses of property which are not deemed
"permitted" as a matter of right but which can be allowed if
certain conditions are met.
The Court of Appeals as well as this Court in the past has
failed to distinguish the various types of zoning cases that arise
in municipalities.

For example, there can be little doubt that the

legislative body of a city is empowered under Utah statutes to
establish various zones of use.

If a person believes that a zone

should be upgraded or downgraded then that person must apply to the
appropriate zoning commission and legislative body for amendment or
change to such zone.

The decision of the legislative body will be
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upheld as long as the zoning provisions are not conficatory,
discriminatory, or arbitrary.

Dowse v. Salt Lake City Corp.,

255 P.2d 723 (Utah 1953); Phi Cappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt
Lake City, 212 P.2d 177 (Utah 1949).
In other instances, persons seek to receive a "variance" which
allows them to build a building, for example, on a lot smaller than
required by the zoning ordinances or to have a sidewalk which is
narrower than required by the ordinances.

The Legislature has

provided that the Board of Adjustment is the correct avenue for
appeal of an administrator's decision denying such variance.

In

those cases the legislative body of a city is not involved.
Thus, the Court of Appeals in interpreting Title 10 of the
Utah Code Annotated Chapter 9 concluded that because Section
10-9-15 provides judicial appeal from an adverse decision of a
Board of Adjustment that ipso facto all decisions made in zoning
matters must be ultimately heard by the Board of Adjustment.
Such a conclusion is absurd since the Board of Adjustment is a
creature created by the legislative body of a city and under the
Court of Appeal's interpretation it, not the legislative body of a
city, would be the final arbitrator of every type of zoning dispute
whether it be over a backyard variance or the permissible uses in a
master plan.
The premise for conditional uses is that certain uses can be
made appropriate for inclusion with other permitted uses specified
within a zoning district if certain mitigating, buffering, spacing,
or site development requirements are in place at a particular site
or property.

As to each application a zoning "establishment"
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decision is made as to the relative use of a specific property
within the district.

This is a legislative function of the

legislative body with recommendation from its own planning
commission.

It is not an executive function of the zoning

administrator or a decision by a zoning official for interpretation
of zoning requirements.
The decision of the Court of Appeals requiring conditional use
permits to be ultimately decided by a Board of Adjustment is both
contrary to the state statutory scheme and inherently impractical
since in many instances members of the zoning commission serve as
members of the Board of Adjustment.

As noted in the dissenting

opinion in Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 81 Utah Adv.

Rptr.

15 (May 3f 1988) such common membership automatically creates the
appearance of a biased appeal.
Since this decision impacts almost every city in Utah which
uses conditional use permits, it is essential that a decision of
this import be made by the state's highest court after a full
briefing on the merits by both parties.
B.

In the Event This Court Reverses Its
Decision of Prior Zoning Cases Relied
Upon by the Court of Appeals, Then the
Decision of the Court of Appeals Must be
Vacated.

The Court of Appeals placed great emphasis upon this Court's
two previous decisions of Chambers v. Smithfield City, 714 P.2d
1133 (Utah 1986) and Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 81 Utah Adv.
Rptr.

15 (May 3, 1988).

It is the understanding of Petitioner

that the Scherbel case has now been taken under advisement for
rehearing.

Because this case contains the same flawed application
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of the Utah zoning statutes, it is essential that the position
taken by the dissent be adopted by this Court and that zoning
matters be separated from matters involving administration of
zoning regulations.
If this Petition for Certiorari is denied then Petitioner will
be required to adhere to the decision of the Court of Appeals even
if this Court subsequently reverses those cases upon which the
Court of Appeals relied•
It is therefore respectfully submitted that in any event this
Court should grant the present Petition even if for the sole
purpose of awaiting any reversal of the Scherbel case so that such
matter may be remanded to the Court of Appeals in light of any
reversal.

Such procedure would protect the interests of Petitioner

pending any new decision by this Court of the critical Scherbel
decision relied upon by the Court of Appeals.
C.

This Court Should Grant a Petition of
Certiorari in Order to Review the Question
Omitted by the Court of Appeals as to
Whether a City is Entitled to Deny a
Conditional Use Permit Because of its
Desire to Disburse Such Uses Rather Than
Cluster Them.

The Court of Appeals as noted in the previous fact statement
completely ignored the contention of Petitioner that its decision
to deny the conditional use permit to the County was primarily
based upon a legitimate and proper reason, namely that the City did
not wish to locate two of these types of facilities next to each
other.

The Court of Appeals listed and rejected every other reason

discussed during the public hearings but patently avoided the
question raised by Petitioner that the avoidance of clustering was
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a legitimate city concern.
Since this concept is utilized by city planners throughout the
State of Utah it is essential that this Court pass upon the
validity of such reasoning in the granting or denying of
conditional use permits.

Even if it is assumed that the Board of

Adjustment should be the ultimate appellate authority within a city
administration, this body of officials still needs to understand
whether the decision of the lower court that such reasoning is
arbitrary and capricious is in fact correct.
While admittedly the impact of the decision relating to the
issue of "clustering" vs. "disbursing" is far less than the impact
relating to the appellate process, it nevertheless is important to
other cities and counties who utilize similar ordinances in their
planning and who have constant applications for similar uses within
a given conditional use zone.
In addition, of course, it is only fundamentally fair that the
Petitioner in this case be given a judicial decision as to the
arguments advanced by it for justifying its actions and that to
completely ignore, as did the Court of Appeals, this fundamental
reason for rejection casts serious aspersions upon the judicial
system.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Court of Appeals in this case has
seriously disrupted the procedures of cities, counties, and
municipalities in matters which have been established for literally
decades.

The decision is not only contrary to the intention of the

Legislature but is also contrary to the spirit and intent of zoning
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laws and procedures.

It is proper that the legislative body of a

city be the final arbitrator in questions relating to use of land
and such decision should not be delegated to a body subservient to
that body.

This extremely important issue was never raised below

nor briefed by either party.
The questionable decisions of this Court in closely related
zoning matters and the pending nature of these cases requires, in
the interest of justice that this case, at a mininum, be suspended
until such time as any new decision is forthcoming from this Court.
In such event, the case could be remanded to the Court of Appeals
to decide in light of any new amended decision by this Court.
Finally, the failure of the Court of Appeals to address the
central issue in this case relating to disbursing or clustering
these type of facilities is not only an egregious violation of
judicial procedure, but also denies other cities and planners the
opportunity to examine the validity of this argument as it relates
to their own problems of conditional uses.
For these reasons, therefore, it is respectfully submitted
that this Court grant the Petition for Certiorari requested by
Clearfield City.
DATED this 12th day of July, 1988.

Craig 3(.Jc6ok
Attorney for Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals
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for the State of Utah to Gerald E. Hess, Assistant Davis County
Attorney, P. 0. Box 618, Farmington, Utah 84025 this 12th day of
July, 1988.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX INDEX

Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals
Memorandum Decision of District Court Judge
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of District Court Judge
Statutes Contained in Title 10, Chapter 9, Articles I and II, Utah
Code Annotated.
Chapter 2, Chapter 12, Clearfield City Ordinances, July 1984
Utah APA Planner, Vol. 14 No, 10 Summer 1988

38

u.i%. • • u u u w a r a m a r k e t i n g v. c o i l i n s F o o d Service
82 Utah Ad\. Rep. 15

IV. CONCLUSION
We agree that Woodward, by its conduct,
waived its right to incentive commissions
under the sales agreement with Collins. The
evidence is uncontroverted that Woodward
was aware of the existence of its right to
receive compensation pursuant to paragraph
3(b) and that it knew such a claim had to be
documented by a daily sales report and submitted monthly. Nonetheless,
Woodward
decided to "roll over and play dead" as it was
"more than willing to settle, for $45,000 a
year." it was not until after the relationship
was terminated that Woodward sought what it
knew it was entitled to receive during the
entire course of its employment. Such
conduct, notwithstanding whatever unexpressed subjective intent Woodward's principal
had, unequivocally evinced an intent to waive
its right to claim the incentive commissions. 3
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's
decision granting Collins* motion for
summary judgment.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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WE CONCUR:
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
1. See. e.g.. In Re Schulte Retail Stores Corp., 22 F.
Supp. 612, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). In the instant case,
the material facts relative to waiver are undisputed
and, accordingly, the trial court's conclusion that
those facts show that Woodward waived its claim is
reviewable as a question of law. See Diversified
Equities. Inc. v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 739
P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("Where the
facts are not in material dispute, interpretation
placed thereon by trial court becomes a question of
law.../).
2. Of course, it is Collins* position that no such
commissions were owed under the contract. A
timely assertion by Woodward would have permitted
the parties an opportunity to address the contractual
ambiguity and adjust the terms to comport with
their negotiations and actual understandings. As to
Woodward's fear that such an inquiry would have
resulted in termination of the contract, it is inconceivable that Collins, having just entered into the
contract with Woodward, would have terminated
the contract if Woodward had sought nothing more
than its due under the contract.
3. While the trial court reached the correct result
applying the doctrine of waiver, other courts have
reached the same result, on similar facts, under
either an estoppel or contract theory- See, e.g.,
Celmer v. Schmitt, 198 Mom. 271, 645 P.2d 946,
948 (1982) (An employee would be estopped from
claiming compensation for overtime work where he
failed to report it or to inform his employer that he
expected compensation for it until he instituted suit
after his discharge.). Cf. Abrams v. Horizon Corp.,
137 Ariz. 73, 669 P.2d 51, 57 (Ariz. 1983)
(salesman's documentation of objection to employer's failure to pay commissions precluded application of doctrine that any course of performance
acquiesced in without objection is given great weight
in interpretation of ambiguous agreement).

OPINION
ORME, Judge:
Clearfield City seeks reversal of a district
court order issuing an extraordinary writ in
the nature of a writ of mandamus. The writ
ordered Clearfield City to issue Davis County
a conditional use permit for a group home.
We affirm.
FACTS
On June 25, 1984, Davis County made
application with the Clearfield City Planning
Commission for a conditional use permit to
operate a residential treatment program for
adolescents and adults suffering from substance abuse. The proposed site was adjacent to
another building operated by Davis County,
known as the Addiction Recovery Center
("ARC"). The sale of the property to Davis
County by Victor Smith had been made
subject to approval of the County's plans by
Clearfield City.
A public hearing to consider the permit was
held on July 18 by the Clearfield City Planning Commission. A number of citizens attended and raised concerns about parking, an
increased crime rate, and the reduction of
property values in the vicinity. Concerns were
also voiced that the use of the property for a
group home would be incompatible with the
"residential" nature of the surrounding area.
The commission denied the application in a
three to one vote, refusing to give any reason
for its decision. As required by city ordinance,.
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Davis County appealed the decision to the |
Clearfield City Council. An inconclusive I
hearing was held on September 11, with
further consideration deferred to October 9.
The Clearfield City Council met in a "pre- |
meeting" on October 9 and discussed the
conditional use permit. The Clearfield City
Manager presented two maps to the City
Council at the pre-meeting which were not
presented at any public hearing. One map
identified "neighborhoods" where the impact
would be greatest if another group home was
permitted. Based on the City Manager's assessment, the two facilities combined would
constitute 1107© of the neighborhood he identified. The other map showed various city
zones and the location of basic social services
within a one mile diameter of the proposed j
site. These services included the Pioneer j
School for the mentally handicapped, the
ARC facility, the Clearfield Convalescent
Center, and the Division of Family Services
Center.
In the formal portion of the October 9
meeting, Councilwoman Reed made a motion
to uphold the Planning Commission's decision
and to deny the appeal for a conditional use
permit. The motion earned.1 Davis County
then filed suit in district court, claiming that I
the actions of the City Council and the Planning Commission were unconstitutional and
asking the court to issue a writ of mandamus
requiring Clearfield to grant the conditional
use permit. The case was heard on April 24
and 25, 1986 and the trial court subsequently
issued a memorandum decision ruling in favor |
of Davis County and authorizing a writ of
mandamus requiring Clearfield City to issue j
the permit.
The trial court found that the city's action
in denying the permit was arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, and without substantial
basis in fact. The court upheld the Clearfield
City zoning ordinance as constitutional, but
found that the city unconstitutionally applied
it because there was no rational or reasonable
basis to deny the permit. Clearfield's request
for a stay of judgment was subsequently
denied and this appeal followed.2
Before turning to the merits of the appeal, it
is necessary to review both the proper procedure for judicial review of the city's action
and the applicable standards of review.
I

1?

nuances within the various zoning enabling
acts by which state legislatures have delegated
the authority to enact and enforce zoning
ordinances to municipalities. Therefore, judicial review of local zoning or planning matters
necessarily depends on the extent to which the
state administrative procedure act is applicable, an interpretation of the enabling legislation, and the provisions of the pertinent local
ordinance. See id.
A. Review pursuant to state administrative
procedure act
Utah's newly created and long overdue
Administrative Procedures Act, Ltah Code
Ann. §§63-46b-l to -21 (1987), does not
apply to this case. Although the Ltah Administrative Procedures Act became effective
January 1, 1988, 1987 Utah Laws ch. 161.
§315, it does not apply to cases aireadv
pending at its effective date. See Angell v.
Board of Review, 750 P.2d 611, 612 n.2 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988). Moreover, unlike in some
states, the Utah act applies only to state and
not to local agencies.3 See Utah Code Ann.
§63-46b-l(l) (1987). The Utah act specifically excludes application to "any political
subdivision of the state, or anv administrative
unit of a political subdivision of the state."
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-20)(b) (1937).

B. Review pursuant to zoning statute
Likewise, and contrary to the city's suggestion on appeal, Davis County was precluded
from using the statutory avenue of appeal
intended as the vehicle for review of zoning
decisions, Utah Code Ann. §10-9-15
(1986), since this case involves an application
to the Planning Commission and an appeal to
the City Council, rather than a decision of the
Board of Adjustment. Section 10-9-15
provides, in relevant part:
The city or any person aggrieved by
any decision of the board of adjustment may have and maintain a
plenary action for relief therefrom
in any court of competent jurisdiction ....
Utah Code Ann. §10-9-15 (1987).
The city argues that Davis County did not
follow the proper procedure for judicial review
of the Gty Council's decision because Davis
County should have commenced the kind of
action contemplated by §10-9-15 rather
I. PROPER PROCEDURE FOR REVIEW
than seeking a writ of mandamus. The city
Judicial review of zoning decisions can be cites the case of Crist v. Mapleton City, 28
characterized as merely a variant of judicial j Utah 7, 497 P.2d 633 (1972), as authority for
review of administrative decision-making. 7 I the proposition that mandamus is not a subsRohan, Zoning and Land Use Controls i titute for appeal, in Crist, the Utah Supreme
§52.01 (1986). Aside from that generaliza- Court held that when an applicant has appetion, there is inconsistency in how the process aled to a board of adjustment, mandamus is
of review occurs. This is a result not only of a not available to compel issuance of a permit;
divergence of practice concerning whether the applicant must seek the "plain, speedy,
state administrative procedure acts govern the and adequate remedy" of judicial review under
review of zoning decisions, but also of the §10-9-15. 497 P.2d at 634.
UTAH ADVA?4CE REPORTS

In this case, however, Davis County was not
in need of review of a board of adjustment
decision. It was aggrieved by action of the
City Council affirming the decision of the
Planning Commission. There is no statutory
recourse similar to §10-9-15 for review of
city council action, apparently leaving the
county with no recourse other than to obtain
review by the traditional means of seeking an
extraordinary writ or, more precisely, appropriate relief available where no other adequate
remedy exists. See Utah R. Civ P 65B(a),
(b)(3).
C. Review pursuant to ordinance
Notwithstanding the unavailability of statutory review pursuant to §10-9-15, the city
claims that Davis County was nonetheless
required to appeal as prescribed by Clearfield
City ordinance. The section of the Clearfield
City ordinance governing the issuance of
conditional use permits, at least as reproduced
in our record, provides that appeals from the
Planning Commission must proceed to review
by the City Council. Appeals from the city
council must then be taken to a court of
competent jurisdiction pursuant to a provision
similar, but not identical to, §10-9-15.
That ordinance provision provides, in relevant
part, with our emphasis added:
Any person aggrieved by or affected by any decision of the Board
of Adjustment or the City Council
mav have and maintain a plenary
action for relief therefrom in any
court of competent jurisdiction ....
While it is true that, if this provision were
vahd, the county should have commenced "a
plenary action for relief in the district court,
the city cannot alter the scope and procedure
for review required by §10-9-15 by simply
inserting the words "or the City Council" into
its ordinance. Where a route of review is
provided by a state statute, a municipality
lacks the power to alter that scheme. See, e.g.,
Cushing v. Smith, 457 A.2d 816, 820 (Me.
1983).
The Utah Supreme Court recently found a
similar procedure invalid because it conflicted
with Utah's enabling act, Utah Code Ann.
§§10-9-1 to -18 (1986). Chambers v.
Smithfield City, 714 P 2d 1133, 1137 (Utah
1986). The enabling act provides that the legislative body of a city, such as Clearfield's
city council, has the right to regulate zoning,
but in order to exercise that power, the legislative body shall provide for a board of adjustment to function as an appellate body for
any person aggrieved by a zoning decision. 714
P 2d at 1136.
The Court m Chambers interpreted §10-915 as expressing a clear legislative intent to
vest the authority to grant variances solely
with the board of adjustment. 714 P 2d at

• Clearfield City
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1136 The ordinance at issue in Chambers
required that variance requests be submitted to
both the board of adjustment and the planning commission, with appeal to the city
council The Court found that the city's procedures conflicted with the enabling act by
vesting the city council, rather than the board
of adjustment, with final authority over the
determination whether or not to grant variances from the zoning ordinances 714 P 2d at
1137 See Scherbel v Salt Lake City Corp , 81
Utah Adv Rep. 15, 16 (1988) (board of adjustment rather than city council is appropriate
body to hear zoning appeals from planning
commission under council-mayor form of
government)
While the Clearfield Cit> ordinance differs
from the one in Chambers, it nonetheless also
fails to provide for final review ot zoning
matters by a board of adjustment as required
by §10-9-15 and endeavors to vest the City
Council with the final determination of conditional use permits. \ legislative bodv may
act as a board ot appeals only when the creation of a board of adjustment is not statutorily mandated 4 See 1 Rohan, Zoning and
Land Use Controls §49 01(5] (1986) ('If the
creation of a zoning board is mandatory, a
local legislative body cannot reserve unto itself
the sole power to grant or deny variances ') See
also Scherbel v Salt Lake City Corp , 81
Utah Adv Rep at 16 ("the authority to
resolve zoning disputes is properly an executive function rather than a legislative one")
Clearfield City cannot be heard to complain
about the inappropnateness of the county's
choice of procedure for obtaining judicial
review in light of its own, flawed conditional
use permit procedures Simply put, Clearfield
Citv imposed on the county a procedure inconsistent with that envisioned in the enabling
act Having done so, it cannot insist on the
method of district court review envisioned in
that act s
Since the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act does not apply to local agencies and this is
not an appeal pursuant to §10-9-15 nor
any other statutonly-prescnbed scheme,
Davis County was entitled to seek judicial
review through a procedure traditionally used
where review is not otherwise provided for
Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
recognizes that appropriate relief may be
granted "where the relief sought is to compel
any inferior tnbunal, or any corporation,
board or person to perform an act which the
law specially enjoins as a dutv resulting from
an office ..." Utah R. Civ P 65B(b)(3)
Therefore, an action for extraordinary relief
was the appropriate vehicle for obtaining
review of the City Council's decision to
uphold denial of the conditional use permit
sought by Davis County *
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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND
DEFERENCE
The unique procedural posture of this case
results in some confusion over the applicable
standard of review both at the trial court level
and on appellate review. While the appeal is
taken from an administrative decision, the
case found its way to district court in the
context of a petition for an extraordinary writ.
Thus, the nature of review by the district court
was a hybrid proceeding involving some elements of administrative review and some elements of an independent civil action. That is,
the trial court did not limit its review to consideration of the record, as is typically the case
in reviewing administrative decisions where a
record is available, but heard two days of
extensive testimony from various witnesses as
is more typical of an independent civil action.
A. Trial Court Review of Administrative
Decision
Clearfield City argues that the trial court
erred in handling review of a city council
decision as, in effect, a trial de novo and that
the court should have been limited to consideration of whether, on the record, the
council's action was arbitrary and capricious
and not supported by substantial evidence.
The Utah Supreme Court recently addressed a
similar argument in Xanthos v. Board of
Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984),
which involved an appeal to the district court
pursuant to §10-9-15 from a decision by a
board of adjustment denying a variance. After
a bench trial, at which the judge heard evidence in addition to that adduced at the board
hearing, the court reversed the board's decision and ordered the board to grant the variance. Salt Lake City argued, as Clearfield City
argues in this case, that the court was limited
to consideration of whether the board's action
was arbitrary and capricious and not supported by substantial evidence.
The Utah Supreme Court defined the scope
of review contemplated by the terms 'plenary
action" as used in §10-9-15. "The nature
and extent of the review depends on what
happened below as reflected by a true record
of the proceedings, viewed in the light of
accepted due process requirements." Id. at
1034 (quoting Denver & Rio Grande Western
R. R. Co. v. Central Weber Sewer Improvemem Dist.f 4 Utah 2d 105, 287 P.2d 884, 887
(1955)). If the hearing had proceeded in accordance with due process requirements, the
reviewing court must look only to the record
"but where it had not or where there was
nothing to review, the reviewing court must be
allowed to get to the facts." Id. The Supreme
Court concluded that the role of the trial court
in reviewing the board's decision is to determine whether the action was so unreasonable
as to be arbitrary and capricious, but "[i]n
order to make that determination, the district

41

court may take additional evidence *o .cru i>
it is relevant to the issues that were raisM .mo
considered by the board." Id. at 1035. « ^
Honn v. City of Coon Rapids. 313 N vv - J
409, 416 (Minn. 1981); 3 Anderson. A.-ervan
Law of Zoning §27.32 (1986) (a cour: -wowing a decision of a local zoning bear J *:u>
take additional evidence if necessary :o aid m
the fair disposition of the caj>e). \d:u^d
involved the question of the proper * tankard
of review under §10-9-15, which fe not :he
basis for this appeal as expiameu arv\e.
However, its reasoning applies at least as
readily to an action commenced pursuant to
Rule 65B to secure a writ.
Even though the record was per hap more
extensive in this case than is typical in .'omnc
matters, we find the trial court was justified in
receiving additional evidence for at least two
reasons. First, the trial court was concerned
about the secretive nature and lack oi an*
record or minutes of the City Council's promeeting." Second, notwithstanding Davis
County's request, the Planning Commission
refused to give its reasons for denying the
permit and the City Council refused to enter
formal findings in support of its decision.
Thus, in order to determine whether the action
taken by the City Council was so unreasonable
as to be arbitrary and capricious, the trial
court received additional evidence to ascertain
what transpired at the pre-meetmg and to
discover the city's actual reasons for denying
the permit.7
B. Appellate Review of Trial Court Decision
Assuming, as we have concluded, that it was
appropriate for the trial court to hear additional testimony, the city argues that this court
is nonetheless precluded from giving deference
to the trial court's decision. Indeed, it is often
stated that an appellate court owes no particular deference to a trial courts prior review
of particular agency action.*
See, e.g., Technomedicai Labs. Inc. v. s'ccunnfs
Div., 744 P.2d 320 (Urah Ct. App. 1987). "When a
lower court has reviewed the administrative decision
and the court's judgment is challenged on appeal,
we review the administrative decision just as • ! ine
appeal had come directly from the agency." Id. ai
321 n.l. See also Benmon v. Utah State /id. oi Oil,
Gas & Mining, 675 P.2d 1135. 1139 ( I u h 19*1/.
This doctrine, of course, makes sense on:> ;ii 'IK-'
context of review of agency action on a record. UK.
appellate court ordinarily gives no presumption oi
correctness to the lower court decision becau v the
lower court's review ot the administrative -ci/jrt! IN
not ordinarily more advantaged than ine 4pr*e' !au
court's review. Benmon v. Utah Slate fid. ni (hi.
Gas & Mining, 675 P.2d at 1139 On 'he jther
hand, when the trial court hears testimony p>m
witnesses, as in this case, "we are part*cularl\
mindful of the advantaged position of the »nai wouri
to hear, weigh and evaluate the tesumo.'.v A «hc
parties." J & M Const. Inc., v. Southam. '22 I* 2d
779, 779 (Utah 1986). See also fen^>:
Br wi. W
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P.2d 150, 152 (Utah l981)(court is "mindful of the
advantaged position of the trial judge who sees and
hears the witness* and therefore "give(sl due deference to his decisions").
Therefore, insofar as the trial court's decision
turns on the administrative record, we give no particular deference to the trial court. But insofar as it
turns on the testimony of witnesses, we defer to the
trial court's advantaged position.
HI. TRIAL COURT'S DECISION
The trial court concluded that the Planning
Commission's action in denying the conditional use permit and the City Council's action
in upholding the denial were arbitrary and
capricious and without substantial basis in
fact. The court also concluded that the Planning Commission and the City Council unconstitutionally applied the applicable provisions
of the zoning ordinance.
A. Lack of evidence supporting city's decision
In its memorandum decision, the trial court
explained that the Planning Commission's
refusal to furnish written findings or at least
provide the basis for its decision so that Davis
County could intelligently respond on appeal
to the City Council, tended to suggest there
was no rational basis for the Planning Commission's decision. With regard to the City
Council's decision, although the court carefully reviewed the verbatim transcript of the
public meetings provided by Da\is County, it
found that "nowhere in the transcripts ... is
there believable information or evidence on
which the Clearfield City Council could have
rationally believed that the proposed mental
health facility would pose any special threat to
Clearfield City's legitimate interest." Consequently, the trial court's decision, for the
most part, turned on testimony received by the
court over a two day period in an effort to
ascertain what the basis for the city's decision
actually was.
The court found that the pre-meeting held
by the City Council on October 9, although
"ostensibly" a public meeting, was not an
open meeting, yet the merits of Davis
County's application were discussed and
council members obviously relied on information supplied in that meeting. The court also
found that the maps presented and relied upon
in the pre-meeting were arbitrarily drawn and
were not presented or explained at the public
meeting.
In its findings, the court reviewed the
reasons suggested at trial for the council's
denial of the permit and found that none were
supported by the evidence. In response to the
.concern that the proposed facility would create
a danger or nuisance because of its proximity
to the junior high school, the court noted that
neither the Davis County School District nor
the junior high administrators appeared at the
public hearings to oppose the proposed facility. Similarly, the police department made a

presentation suggesting that crime would not
increase in the area if the facility were permitted.
With regard to the concern over real estate
values, the court found that no studies were
made and no opinions were given by professional real estate appraisers nor was any credible evidence of reduced property values produced at the hearings. In a similar vein, two
professional planners were employed by the
city but neither voiced any objection to granting the application.
Even if the reasons given in the motion
adopted by the council might otherwise be
legally sufficient, see Note 1, supra, the denial
of a permit is arbitrary when the reasons are
without sufficient factual basis. See, e.g.. C.R.
In vs., Inc. v. Village of Shoreview, 304
N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 1981). In Shoreview,
several single-family homeowners objected to
the use of land in their vicinity for construction of multiple dwellings. At the public
meeting, they expressed concerns about traffic
problems, reduced property values, and
density. The court in Shoreview reviewed these
reasons and concluded that the planning
commission's stated reasons for denying the
special use permit, an action which was upheld
by the city council, did not have factual
support in the "vague reservations expressed
by either the single family owners or the
commission members." Id. at 325. The court
found the reasons did not justify denial of the
permit "even though they would have been
legally sufficient had the record demonstrated
a factual basis for them." Id.
B. "Public ciamor"
Based on its review of the testimony, and
the lack of any credible evidence in support of
the city council's articulated reasons for
denying the application, the trial court found
that the city council's decision was based on
"public clamor,"9 which was not a legally
sufficient basis for denying the permit. The
court explained:
Indeed, there is almost uniform
public clamor when any mental
health facility, halfway house, jail
or prison is proposed. The public
realizes the need for such facilities,
but they should always be located
somewhere else .... Citizen opposition is a consideration which must
be weighed, but cannot be the sole
basis for the decision to deny.
The Utah Supreme Court recognized the
validity of the trial court's concern in Thurston v. Cache County, 626 P.2d 440 (Utah
1981). In Thurston, the Court, in upholding
the Cache County Planning Commission's
denial of conditional use permits to build
residences in an agricultural area, acknowledged that, while there is no impropriety in the
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solicitation of or reliance on the advice of
neighboring landowners, "the consent of neighboring landowners may not be made a criterion for the issuance or denial [of] a conditional use permit. * Id. at 445.
In a case factually more similar to the
instant one, the Wyoming Supreme Court
stated that "[tjhe opposition of neighbors is
not one of the considerations to be taken into
account" when determining whether to issue a
development permit. Board
of
County

facts, and not mere emotion or
local opinion, in making such a
decision.
Id. at 776. Accord, Chanhassen Estates Residents Ass'n v. City of Chanhassen, 342 N.W.
2d 335, 340 (Minn. 1984) ("[Dlenial of a
conditional use must be based on something
more concrete than neighborhood opposition
and expressions of concern for public safety
and welfare.").

Comm'rs

C. Conclusion
While the reasons given by the Clearfield
City Council for denying the permit might be
legally sufficient if supported, the trial court
was correct in concluding that the offered
reasons are without factual basis in the record.
What the court found to be the real reason for
the action, "public clamor," is not an adequate legal basis for the city's decision. Therefore, we agree with the trial court that Clearfield City acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
denying the conditional use permit for reasons
which either had no factual basis or were not
legally sufficient. Because we find the decision
arbitrary and capricious, we have no need to
consider whether the city's ordinance was
unconstitutional on its face or as applied. 10 .
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision.

v. Teton County Youth Services

Inc., 652 P.2d 400, 411 (Wyo. 1982). In that
case, the county commission denied an application for a development permit, submitted by
Youth Services, to use an existing facility as
an alternative residential treatment center for
the care and treatment of juveniles in need of
supervision or emotionally and socially handicapped. The Wyoming Supreme Court agreed
with the trial court that the commission's
decision had to be set aside since the commission found that neighbors opposed the proposed development and the court could not
determine the weight the commission gave to
such "unauthorized criteria" in making its
decision. Id. at 411.
In another case involving judicial review of
local action denying conditional use permits, City of Barnum v. County of Carlton, 386
N . W . 2d 770, affirmed on remand, 394 N.W.
2d 246 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), the City of
Barnum sought a writ'of mandamus to compel
the county board to issue a conditional use
permit to allow it to construct a wastewater
treatment facility. The district court denied the
writ and the city appealed. The Minnesota
Court of Appeals found that Carlton County
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying
the city's application and reversed the district
court and remanded with instructions to issue
the writ of mandamus ordering the county
board to issue the conditional use permit. 386
N.W. 2d at 776. The court in Barnum. noting
that the failure by the county board to make
sufficient findings in support of its decision
made the court's task of review "highly impractical" because "[t]here is no way to determine from the record ... what the county
board's thinking was when it denied the conditional use permit," id. at 775, rejected the
county's argument that its decision was based
upon concerns aired by property owners at the
public meeting. The court stated that though
these sentiments may be weighed in a zoning
decision, "they may not be the sole basis for
granting or denying a given permit." Id. The
court characterized the county's decision in
these terms:
Its decision appears to have been
merely a response to public opposition. This is an insufficient basis
upon which to deny a conditional
use permit. A county must rely on

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
Judith M. Billings, Judge
1. The motion referred to the following "reasons":
Clearfield's responsiveness to the community and the County's special needs
by four structured residential and residential-type facilities within the radius
of one mile: and that 11°M> ot the land
would be designated to this particular
tyDe of structured residential use; and
that to uphold the Clearfield master
plan and zoning ordinance to minimize
the changes of the characteristics of the
neighborhood.
2. We are advised that, upon demah of the motion
for stay, the county closed its .transaction *ith
Victor Smith, acquired the sue, made such renovations as might have been necessarv to adapt the
large residence to the county's purpose, and has
continuously operated the treatment tacilit\ for
some two years now.
3. While some states have specifically made their
administrative procedure acts applicable to local
agencies, at least one state has achieved the same
result through the interpretation ol rules ot procedure. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Teton
County Youth Servs. Inc., 652 P.2d 400, 416 (W>o.
1982). Assuming favorable experience with the Ltah
Administrative Procedures Act, the Legislature may,
in due course, wish to consider extending its application to local agencies.
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4. The enabling act for aty zoning is different from 9. The clamor is typified by the curious action taken
the enabling act for county zoning. The county act at the Planning Commission hearing, where citizens
makes the decision to appoint a board of adjust- in attendance were asked to vote on the application.
ment discretionary with the county commission Only one person voted for the facility and all others
rather than mandatory as under the city enabling in the audience voted against it.
act. Chambers v. Smithfield City, 714 P.2d 1133, 10. As noted in section 1(c) of this opinion, the
1137 (Utah 1986).
city's ordinance is inconsistent with generally appl5. The county might have premised its attack on the icable state law, at least insofar as it vests in the city
City Council's action on the ground that the council council, rather than a board of adjustment, the final
was not authorized to hear the zoning appeal. See, word on applications for conditional use permits. In
e.g., Scherbei v. Salt Lake City Corp., 81 Utah that sense, the ordinance is unconstitutional under
Adv. Rep. at 16. It did not do so. Nor does the city the supremacy clause contained in Utah Const. Art.
contend in this appeal that the county should have XI, §5. See AUgood v. Larson, 545 P.2d 530. 532
appealed to a body other than the City Council, a (Utah 1976).
position it would in any event be estopped from
asserting. The city's point is that the City Council
functioned as a kind of board of adjustment and
that, therefore, judicial review of its decision should
Cite as
have been accomplished in the same way as review
82 Utah Adv. Rep. 44
of board of adjustment decisions.
6. By either route, mandamus or review pursuant to
IN THE
the statute, thjuase would have ended up in district
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
court. It ma/oe that denominating the proceeding
as "mandamus" or as a "plenary action" under §109-15 is neither determinative nor "anything other Richard F. BRIMLEY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
than a technicality which did not adversely affect
v.
the rights of the parties." Crist v. Maplcton City,
497 P.2d 633, 636 (Utah 1972) (Crockett, J., disse- Joseph S. GASSER, Jr.,
nting). The city apparently believes its decision
Defendant and Respondent.
would be entitled to more deference if reviewed
under §10-9-15 than in the context of a mand- Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson and
amus action. Of couse, whatever minimal benefit Davidson.
the county receives by virtue of its appeal being in
the mandamus context is a direct consequence of the No. 870154-CA
city's own questionable procedure for obtaining a FILED: May 13, 1988
conditional use permit.
7. We note that in taking additional evidence and THIRD DISTRICT
making its detailed findings, the trial court made a
fair and disciplined effort to understand the basis Honorable Richard H. Moffat
for the city's decision. In no sense did it venture ATTORNEYS:
beyond its role as the court was said to have done in Wynn E. Bartholomew for Appellant.
Xanthos and decide the case "according to [its]
notion of what was in the best interests of the citi- Don B. Allen for Respondent.
zens" of Clearfield City. Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment, 685 P.2d at 1035.
OPINION
8. That notion has always been a bit of an overstatement. Even if not strictly required, deference is no DAVIDSON, Judge:
doubt given where the trial court's analysis is illuPlaintiff Richard Brimley appeals from the
minating. Cf. Zions First Natl'l Bank v. National
Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988) district court's order which: 1) granted defe("Although we may not defer to a trial court's ndant Joseph Gasser's motions for satisfacconclusion on a legal question, we certainly may tion of judgment and relief from judgment;
derive great benefit from the trial judge's views on and 2) refused Brimley's motion that he was
the issue and may be persuaded by those views."). entitled to certain personal property of
In any case, the Utah practice of duplicative, two- Gasser's which Brimley had purchased at a
tiered judicial review of agency action has been time- sheriffs sale.
consuming and inefficient. The Utah Administrative
Although the parties to this appeal share a
Procedures Act wisely breaks from this approach. lengthy history, it is sufficient to begin on
Informal agency action, where no record is made,
will be reviewed in district court on a trial de novo May 1, 1981, when Brimley obtained a default
basis, in connection with which a record will be judgment against Gasser in the amount of
generated. See Utah Code Ann. §6J-46b-l5(l)(a) 536,650.00, with interest accruing at the rate
(1986). Appellate review would proceed on the of eight percent per annum. For one year
record made in the trial court. Conversely, formal Gasser ignored the judgment and paid
agency action, which generates a record, is reviewed nothing. Then, on May 29, 1982, Gasser exedirectly by this court or by the Utah Supreme cuted a promissory note payable to Brimley in
Court. See Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(l) the amount of $41,501.62 with interest accr(1986). This approach leaves each level of court uing at eighteen percent per annum. The note
doing what it does best-trial courts receiving and
evaluating testimony and appellate courts reviewing was due "on or before December 31, 1982 said
loan to be secured by fifty thousand shares of
records and resolving legal issues.
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In the District Court of the Second Judicial District
IN AND FOR THE

County of Davis, State of Utah

DAVIS COUNTY,
Plaintiff,.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Civil No. 36431

vs.
CLEARFIELD CITY,
Defendant.

This case came before the Court for trial on April 24, 1986,
with Gerald E. Hess appearing for the plaintiff, Davis County,
Steven R. Bailey appearing for the plaintiff, Victor Smith, and
Melvin C. Wilson appearing for the defendants, Clearfield City
and Clearfield City Planning Commission. After presentation of
evidence and argument, the court took the case under advisement.
The court now rules on the case.
The court finds the actions of the Clearfield City Council
and the Clearfield City Planning Commission in denying a
conditional use permit to Davis County for a mental health
transitional facility to be arbitrary and capricious and without
substantial basis in fact. Also, there was no rational basis for
the denial.
Clearfield City is ordered to approve the
conditional use permit. The court does not, however, find the
Clearfield City Zoning Ordinance unconstitutional.
The court
orders each party to pay their own costs.
Davis County, through its Department of Mental Health made
an application to Clearfield City on June 25, 1984, for a
conditional use permit for a mental health transitional facility
at 904 South State in Clearfield City. Clearfield City personnel
aided Davis County in the preparation of a proper application.
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The Clearfield City Planning Commission held a public hearing on
July 18, 1984. The hearing lasted about two and one-half hours.
The Planning Commission denied the application. No findings of
fact or conclusions of law were made. Several persons present at
the meeting expressed their opinions as to the basis for ruling.
None are acceptable or authorized by the Planning Commission,
however. Davis County wrote a letter on July 30, 1984, asking
Clearfield City for formal findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and decision so that it could intelligently respond to these
matters on the appeal to the City Council.
Clearfield City
failed to furnish any. This court must, therefore, conclude that
there was not a rational basis for such decision by the Planning
Commission.
The Clearfield City Council held public hearings on
September 11, 1984, and October 9, 1984.
The September 11
meeting was a lengthy public meeting. All sides were given ample
opportunity to present their views. The hearing was continued to
October 9 so that research could be done on the application and
so that a legal opinion could be obtained.
The October 9 public meeting began at 7:15 P. M. It was a
relatively short meeting.
Councilwoman Shirley Reed made a
motion almost at the beginning of the meeting to uphold the
decision of the Planning Commission. The City Council had met in
ostensibly a public meeting at 6:00 P. M. of the same evening
without any outsiders being present and discussed the merits of
the plaintiffs1 application. It in fact was not an open meeting.
No minutes were taken of the meeting.
The Council members
obviously relied on information supplied in that meeting,
however. This was evident from the statements made by them in
the later meeting.
No findings of fact, conclusions of law, or formal opinion
came out of either the September 11 or October 9 meeting.
Fortunately, the Davis County Mental Health tape recorded and
transcribed both meetings verbatim.
The court has read the
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transcripts carefully.
No where in the transcripts do I find
believable information or evidence on which the Clearfield City
Council could have rationally believed that the proposed mental
health facility would pose any special threat to Clearfield
City's legitimate interests.
There is no zone in Clearfield wherein the proposed facility
could be located as a matter of right. Davis County had to rely
on a conditional us*e permit. Clearfield City's zoning ordinance
changed just prior to the October 9, 1984, decision. Previous to
the change 904 South State was located in a PO zone or
professional office zone.
This area had been changed from a
residential zone to PO zone in about 1979. After the September
1984 zone change it was known as a C-l zone.
The evidence at the public hearings shows that residential
zones are the
preferable zones for the type of facility
proposed by plaintiffs.
There is, however, a stigma that is
still attached to mental health facilities.
It is generally
believed that somehow the location of such a facility in a
residential zone will endanger the residents of the area and
lower property values.
Believable studies show that neither of
these propositions is true. Nevertheless, both Clearfield City
and other cities in Davis County have been very reluctant to
approve such facilities in residential zones. In an effort to
accommodate such feelings, the Davis County Mental Health has
made application for such facilities in zones that are not
strictly residential. Such is the case here. The PO zone or C-l
zone would appear to be an acceptable alternative to the more
desirable residential zones.
The evidence at the public hearings show that the decision
to deny was made because of public clamor.
Indeed, there is
almost uniform public clamor when any mental health facility,
halfway house, jail or prison is proposed. The public realizes
the need for such facilities, but they should always be located
somewhere else. The plaintiffs need in this case was to locate
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in the North end of Davis County. This was to serve the needs of
the citizens living in the North end of the County, although
there would be persons from all parts of the County housed in the
facility from time to time.
Citizen opposition is a
consideration which must be weighed, but cannot be the sole basis
for the decision to deny.
Two professional planners were involved in this case.
Neither Wilford Summercorn, the Clearfield City Planner nor Wally
Baird, the Clearfield City Manager could find any professional
objection to the granting of the application.
Some suggestion was made during the trial that Clearfield
City was not doing its share to approve public service facilities
within the City limits. Such a suggestion is absurd. Clearfield
City has a great deal of public spirit and public responsibility.
They are responsive to the needs of society. While occasionally
disputes such as this arise, it does not take away from their
willingness to promote the public good.
Two areas of concern were put forth at the public hearings
that deserve consideration. First was the idea that the proposed
facility would create a danger or a nuisance because of its
proximity to a junior high school, an alcohol rehabilitation
center, and residents. Neither the Davis County School District
nor the junior high administrators opposed the proposed facility.
This was so even though it was public knowledge that the facility
would house minors with drug problems and other mental health
problems.
The police department made a presentation at the
hearings, but did not show that crime would increase in the area.
There was some vague concern for possible future problems, but
nothing concrete. The existence of the ARC just north of 904
South State since 1981 had not created criminal problems in the
area.
No evidence showed any likelihood of increased social
problems because this facility and the ARC would be adjacent to
one another.
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The second area of concern involved real estate values.
Property owners expressed opinions that property values would go
down.
No studies were made however.
No professional real
estate appraisers gave their opinions, except for* the plaintiff,
Victor Smith. His interest in the matter taints his testimony,
but does not mean it should be disregarded. It was his opinion
that the ARC had not impacted property values in the area and
that the proposed facility would not. Some possible uses of the
new C-l zone, such as a restaurant or garage or multiple
apartment dwelling might lower property values, but not the
proposed facility.
No credible evidence of reduced property
values was produced at the hearings.
An argument was made that 11% of the land in a designated
area would be devoted to public service uses if the application
were granted.
This 11% figure has no validity.
The area
included and excluded from the designated area was arbitrarily
drawn. It did not include a separate neighborhood or the PO zone
or any other area distinguishable on a reasonable basis. Also,
the map used for the area, along with the conclusions to be drawn
from the map were discussed at the preplanning meeting on October
9, 1984, and not at the public hearing. The map was not used at
the public meeting or explained to those present at the public
meeting.
An argument was made that Clearfield City did not want the
proposed facility and the ARC adjacent to each other.
No
evidence was produced to show that any harm would come from the
arrangement, except that the property would be taken off the tax
producing rolls of Clearfield City. This was insufficient reason
to justify a denial.
An argument was made that there were four structured
residential type facilities located within a radius of one mile
of the proposed facility. The facts may be true but Clearfield
City is only about 2.5 miles in diameter. After the application
was denied, Clearfield City suggested five possible alternate
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sites to Davis County. There was no guarantee that any of the
five sites would be approved. Three of the five were near the
hospital which is within Layton City limits. In that general
vicinity there are seven or eight facilities including the
hospital, two clinics, two doctors office buildings, a physical
rehabilitation home, and an alcohol rehabilitation center. It
appears that Clearfield City prefers to cluster these facilities
into one area.
There is nothing wrong with the clustering
method, but in this case it does not meet the criteria for a
residential transitional mental health facility, because of the
lack of residential surroundings, bus transportation, schools,
and churches.
Perhaps an ultimate question is whether Davis County Mental
Health can pick the site or Clearfield City can pick the site.
The site proposed in the application is the only one having an
existing facility. All other proposed sites require a building
project. The answer is obvious. Davis County Mental Health has
the right to pick their own site.
If Clearfield City has a
rational basis for denying the application, then its decision
will be upheld.
If reasons are given, but the reasons are
specious or fail the reasonable person test, then the reasons
will be disregarded. There must be substance to the reasons.
A decision is said to be arbitrary when it is arrived at
through will or caprice.
A decision is capricious when it
proceeds from whim or fancy. A decision is without basis in fact
when it cannot be supported with rational facts and arguments.
The decision of the Clearfield City Planning Commission and the
Clearfield City Council was well intentioned, but falls into the
above categories.
The plaintiff, Davis County, is ordered to draw a formal
opinion in conformity to this decision.

-%-

Dated May 7, 1986.

Certificate of Mailing:
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision to Gerald E»
Hess, Davis County Attorney's Office, Farmington, Utah; Melvin C«
Wilson, 133 South State, Suite 203f Clearfield, Utah 84015 and
Steven R. Bailey, 2564 Washington Blvd., Suite 2, Ogden, Utah
84401 on May 8, 1986.

/(*&« /Ufa
Deputy/Xlerk

FIL5DIN nmrz<r:

LOREN D. MARTIN
Davis County Attorney
Courthouse Building
Farmington, Utah 84025
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT,^
if?J] t Ulan
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH
DAVIS COUNTY, a body politic
of the State of Utah, and
VICTOR SMITH,
Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT

vs.

AND

CLEARFIELD CITY, a municipal
corporation of the State of
Utah and the
CLEARFIELD CITY PLANNING
COMMISSION,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 36431

Defendants.

The above matter, having come on regularly for trial on
April 24, 1986, before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, one of
the judges of the above-entitled court; Plaintiff Davis County
being represented by Gerald E. Hess, Deputy Davis County
Attorney, and Plaintiff Victor Smith being represented by Steven
R. Bailey, and Defendants being represented by Melvin C. Wilson;
and witnesses having been called and testimony having been taken
and exhibits having been introduced, and the Court being fully
advised in the premises, now makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Davis County, through its Department of Mental

Health, made an application to Clearfield City on June 25, 1984

f\Lt •j\eo

for a Conditional Use Permit for a Mental Health Transitional
Facility to be located at 904 South State in Clearfield, Utah.
2.

Davis County had obtained an earnest money

agreement with Victor Smith for the purchase of the property
located at 904 South State Street in Clearfield, Utah, subject to
approval of the Conditional Use Permit by Clearfield City.
3.

Clearfield City personnel aided Davis County in the

preparation of the application for a Conditional Use Permit.
4.

Pursuant to notice, the Clearfield City Planning

Commission held a public hearing on July 18, 1984, to consider
the application of Davis County, which hearing lasted
approximately 2 1/2 hours.
5.

No accurate written record of the Planning

Commission Hearing was preserved, and no findings of fact or
conclusions of law were made.
6.

The Planning Commission voted to deny the

Conditional Use Permit Application of Davis County.
7.

Several persons present at the meeting expressed

their opinions as to the basis for the Planning Commission
ruling, but no official or authorized reason for the ruling was
ever stated by the Planning Commission.
8.

Clearfield City failed to furnish to Davis County

any findings of fact, conclusions of law, or decision from the
Clearfield City Planning Commission even though Davis County made
written request for them.
9.

On.July 26, 1984, Davis County filed with

Clearfield City a formal appeal of the denial of the Conditional
2

Use permit by the Clearfield City Planning Commission, which
appeal was made to the Clearfield City Council in accordance with
the Clearfield City Ordinances.
10.

The Clearfield City Council held public hearings on

September 11, 1984, and thereafter on October 9, 1984, to
consider the appeal of Davis County.
11. The September 11, 1984, meeting was a lengthy public
meeting where all sides were given ample opportunity to present
theif views.
12.

The hearing of September 11, 1984, was continued to

Octoper 9, 1984, at 7:15 p.m., so that research could be done on
the application, and so that a legal opinion could be obtained.
13.

The October 9, 1984, continuation of the public

hearing began at 7:15 p.m., and was a relatively short meeting.
14. Councilwoman Shirley Reed made a motion almost at
the beginning of the October 9, 1984, meeting to uphold the
decision of the Planning Commission.
15.

The City Council had met in ostensibly a public

meeting at 6:00 p.m. on October 9, 1986, without any outsiders
being present or invited, and discussed the merits of the
Application of Davis County.
16.

No minutes were taken of the portion of the City

Council meeting which began at 6:00 p.m. on October 9, 1984.
17.

The City Council members relied on information

supplied to them at the meeting which began at 6:00 p.m., and the
information supplied to the City Council at the meeting which
3

began at 6:00 p.m. was not presented when the public hearing
commenced at 7:15 p.m. on October 9, 1984.
18.

No findings of fact, conclusions of law, or formal

opinion came out of either the September 11, 1984, meeting or the
October 9, 1984, meeting.
19.

Although Clearfield City did not tape record or

transcribe the proceedings of the public hearing, Davis County
Mental Health recorded and transcribed both meetings verbatim,
and nowhere in the transcripts is there believable information or
evidence on which the Clearfield City Council could have
rationally believed that the proposed Mental Health facility
would pose any special threat to Clearfield City's legitimate
interest.
20.

There is no zone in Clearfield City wherein the

proposed facility could be located as a matter of right, and
therefore, Plaintiff Davis County had to rely on a Conditional Use
Permit in order to place a Mental Health facility in Clearfield
City.
21.

Clearfield City's Zoning Ordinance changed just

prior to the October 9, 1984, public hearing.

Previous to the

change, 904 South State was located in a PO zone, or Professional
Office zone.
22.

The area located at approximately 904 South State

Street, Clearfield, Utah, had been a residential zone prior to
1979, but was changed to a PO zone in approximately 1979.
23.

After the September 1984 zone change, the subject

property was included in a C-l zone.
4

23.

At the public hearings, evidence was presented to

the effect that residential zones are the preferable zones for
the type of facility proposed by Plaintiffs Davis County.
24.

Evidence presented at the public hearings

demonstrates there is a stigma attached to Mental Health
facilities, so that many who live in residential zones believe
they will be endangered by persons who will be housed in the
Mental Health facility, and also that the property values in the
vicinity will be lowered.
25.

Presented at the public hearings were believable

studies which show that residents of the Mental Health facility
proposed will not endanger residents-of the surrounding area, nor
will the placement of a Mental Health facility lower property
values in the area.
26.

Both Clearfield City and other cities in Davis

County have been reluctant to approve Mental Health facilities in
residential zones.

In an effort to accommodate such feelings, the

Davis County Mental Health has made application for such
facilities in zones that are not strictly residential, such as
the Professional Office zone in which the proposed facility is
located.
27.

Placement of the Mental Health facility in the PO

zone or C-l zone would appear to be an acceptable alternative to
the more desirable residential zones.
28.

There was evidence presented at the public hearing

that residents believed a Mental Health facility was a good idea,
but not located near them.
5

29.

The evidence at the public hearings show that the

decision to deny was made because of public clamor.
30.

The Plaintiff's need as presented in the public

hearing was to locate in the north end of Davis County, so as to
serve the needs of the citizens living in the north end of Davis
County.

Although residents of Clearfield City would be assisted

at the Mental Health Center, persons from all parts of the county
would be housed in the facility from time to time.
31.

Two professional planners involved in the public

hearings could find no significant professional objection to the
granting of the application.
33.

Some suggestion was made during the trial that

Clearfield City was not doing its share to approve public service
facilities within the city limits; but the evidence shows
Clearfield City has a great deal of public spirit and public
responsibility, and are responsive to the needs of society,
although occasionally disputes do arise, but it is clear that
Clearfield City desires to promote the public good.
34.

Some members of the Clearfield City Planning

Commission and the Clearfield City Council expressed concern that
placement of the Mental Health facility would create a danger or
nuisance because of its proximity to a junior high school, an
Alcohol Rehabilitation Center, and to residents.
35.

Neither the Davis County School District nor any

representative from the adjacent junior high appeared at the
public hearings to oppose the proposed facility.
6

36.

Dr. Russell Williams, Director of Davis County

Mental Health, testified at the public hearings that placement of
the Mental Health facility at the proposed location would not
create any significant problems for residents of the facility,
nor would residents of the facility create any danger or nuisance
to students at the junior high school, Alcohol Rehabilitation
residents, or local residents.
37.

The Clearfield City Police Department made a

presentation at the hearings, but did not show that crime would
increase in the area, although there was some vague concern
expressed for possible future problems, but nothing concrete.
38.

The-existence of the ARC just north of 904 South

State Street since 1981 had not created criminal problems in the
area.
39.

No evidence presented to the Planning Commission

showed any likelihood of increased social problems because this
facility and the ARC would be adjacent to one another.
40.

No studies were made and no professional real

estate appraisers presented any negative opinion to the hearings
before the Planning Commission and the City Council, except for
Plaintiff Victor Smith.

His interest in the matter taints his

testimony, but does not mean it should be disregarded.

It was

his opinion that the ARC had not impacted property values in the
area, and that the proposed facility would not.

Some possible

uses of the new C-l zone such as a restaurant or garage or
multiple apartment dwelling might lower property values, but not
the proposed facility.
7

41.

No evidence of reduced property values was produced

at the hearings, except from persons who owned property in the
area, and their concerns were based upon fear of what might
happen, rather than upon any objective study.
42.

In the motion made by a Clearfield City

Councilperson to deny the Conditional Use Permit, reference was
made to the fact that eleven percent of land in a designated area
would be devoted to public service uses if the application were
granted.

This eleven percent figure has no validity.

The area

included and excluded from the designated area was arbitrarily
drawn.

It did not include a separate neighborhood or the PO zone

or any other area distinguishable on a reasonable basis. Also,
the map used for the area, along with the conclusions to be drawn
from the map were discussed at the preplanning meeting on October
9, 1984, and not at the public hearing.

The map was not used at

the public meeting or explained to those present at the public
meeting.
43.

No evidence was produced at the public hearing to

show that any harm would come from the proposed facility being
located adjacent to the present ARC, except that the property
would be taken off the tax producing rolls of Clearfield City.
44.

Members of the Clearfield City Council indicated

one reason for denial of the proposed facility was that there
were four structured residential type facilities located within a
radius of one mile of the proposed facility.
45.

Clearfield City is only about 2.5 miles in

diameter.
8

46.

After the Clearfield City Council denied the

application, the city suggested five possible alternate sites to
Davis County, but there was no guarantee that any of the five
sites would be approved as a Conditional Use, either by the
Clearfield City Planning Commission, or the Clearfield City
Council.

Three of the five sites were near the hospital which is

within Layton City,
47.

Clearfield City requested and received from Davis

County a great deal of information related to the economic
feasibility of acquiring the Vic Smith property and transforming
it into a Mental Health facility.
48•

Any of the sites recommended by Clearfield City

were vacant properties and buildings would have been required to
be constructed on the various sites.
49.

One Clearfield City Councilman who visited the ARC

facility expressed fear and apprehension as he entered the
facility, but after he had learned about the kind of people
receiving treatment in the facility and the various treatment
programs, his fear of the facility vanished.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes
and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff has no plain and adequate remedy at law.

2.

Plaintiff Davis County has exhausted its

administrative remedies.
3.

There was not a rational or reasonable basis for

denial of the Application for Conditional Use Permit by the
9

Clearfield City Planning Commission, in that the Clearfield City
Planning Commission unconstitionally applied Section 11 of
Chapter 12 of the Clearfield Zoning Ordinance in violation of
%

Section 7 and Section 24 of Article I of the Utah Constitution
and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
4.

The City Council meeting which commenced on October

9, 1984, at 6:00 p.m. was not an open meeting, as required by the
statutes of the State of Utah.
5.

Citizen opposition to the proposed Mental Health

facility must be weighed, but cannot be the sole basis for the
decision to deny the Conditional Use Permit.
6.

The actions of the Clearfield City Planning

Commission and the Clearfield City Council in denying a
Conditional Use"Permit to Plaintiff Davis County for a Mental
Health Transitional Facility was arbitrary and capricious and
discriminatory and without substantial basis in fact.
7.

There was no rational or reasonable basis for

defendant Clearfield City Council to deny the Conditional Use
Permit to Davis County, in that the Clearfield City Council
unconstitutionally applied Section 11 of Chapter 12 of the

^^r0*

Clearfield Zoning Ordinance in violation of Section 7 and Section
24 of Article I of the Utah Constitution and of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
8.

The Clearfield City Zoning Ordinance, in effect on

June 25, 1984, and as thereafter amended, is not
unconstitutional.
10
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9.

A Writ of Mandamus should be issued ordering and

requiring the Clearfield City Planning Commission and the
Clearfield City Council to approve the Conditional Use Permit
Application of Plaintiff Davis County, and issue a Conditional
Use Permit to Davis County, thereby authorizing Davis County to
operate a Mental Health Transitional Treatment facility at 904
South State Street, Clearfield, Utah.
10.

Each party should be required to bear its own costs

and attorney's fees.
DATED this

,?^$? day of May, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to:
Melvin C. Wilson
Attorney at Law
133 South State Street, Suite 203
Clearfield, Utah 84015
and ~
Steven R. Bailey
Attorney at Law
2564 Washington Blvd., Suite 2
Ogden, Utah 84401
with-pootage pyriipaisl thereon, this
?«/-'

V C

day of May, 1986.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIA^ DISTRICT rf
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH

LLP JI i CILRT

DAVIS COUNTY, a body politic
of the State of Utah, and
VICTOR SMITH,
Plaintiffs,

JUDGMENT AND

vs.

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

CLEARFIELD CITY, a municipal
corporation of the State of
Utah and the
CLEARFIELD CITY PLANNING
COMMISSION,

Civil No. 36431

Defendants.

The above matter, having come on regularly for trial on
April 24, 1986, before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, one of
the judges of the above-entitled court; Plaintiff Davis County
being represented by Gerald E. Hess, Deputy Davis County
Attorney, and Plaintiff Victor Smith being represented by Steven
R. Bailey, and Defendants being represented by Melvin C. Wilson;
and witnesses having been called and testimony having been taken
and exhibits having been introduced, and the Court having made
and entered its Findings of Fact and conclusions of law;
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and
decreed as follows:

RLMED

1.

The Clearfield City Planning Commission and the

Clearfield City Council are hereby ordered to approve the
Conditional Use Permit Application of Plaintiff Davis County, and
to issue a Conditional Use Permit to Plaintiff Davis County,
thereby allowing and authorizing Davis County to operate a Mental
Health Transitional Treatment Facility at the address commonly
known as 904 South State Street, Clearfield, Utah.
2.

The Clearfield City Zoning Ordinance in effect on

June 25, 1984, and subsequently amended is constitutional, and
the request of Plaintiff Davis County to declare the ordinance
unconstitutional is hereby denied with prejudice.
3.

Each party shall bear its own costs and attorney's

fees.
DATED this ^f

day of May, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

M I C H A E L G^ALLPJ-:«r., C L Z ^ K
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Section
10-9-28
10-9-29

Short title — Definitions
Severability clause — Jurisdiction of
commission over public property

Section
10-9-30

10-9-1

Violation of chapter or ordinance
punishable as misdemeanor —
Remedies of municipality and
owners of real estate.

ARTICLE 1
ZONING POWER OF CITIES AND TOWNS
10-9-1. Power to regulate and restrict height and size of
buildings and height and location of trees and
other vegetation — Regulations to encourage use
of solar and other forms of energy.
For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals and the general welfare
of the community the legislative body of cities and towns is empowered to
regulate and restrict the height, number of stories and size of buildings and
other structures, the height and location of trees and other vegetation, the
percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts and other open
spaces, the density of population and the location and use of buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes. Regulations
and restrictions of the heights and number of stories of buildings and other
structures, and the height and location of trees and other vegetation shall not
apply to existing buildings, structures, trees or vegetation except for' new
growth on such vegetation. These regulations may also enopurage energy-efficient patterns of development, the use of solar and other renewable forms of
energy, and energy conservation and may assure access to sunlight for solar
energy devices.
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 1; R.S. 1933,
15-8-89; L. 1941, ch. 18, & 1; C. 1943, 15-8-89;
L. 1981, ch. 44, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amendment inserted the height and location of trees
and other vegetation in the first sentence, and
added the last two sentences
Cross-References. — Airport zoning regulations, & 2 4-1 et seq
Building and fire regulations, § 10-8-52
Conformity to zoning ordinances of other politicai subdivisions, ^ i 1-16-1

County zoning and planning, § 17-27-1 et
seq
Lumberyards and combustible materials,
pro h,bition within fire limits, § 10-8-70.
Planning Enabling Act and
Mumcipal
, .
,
r
4,
^ n ^ i o /
thereunder,
* 10*9-19 et seq.
Slum
clearance, §§ 11-15-1 et seq., 11-19-1
et seq
State planning coordinator, § 63-28-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Deed restrictions and covenants
Fraternity and sorority houses
Gasoline filling and service station
Initiative power of the people
Judicial review
Prior nonconforming use
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Key Numbers. — Municipal Corporations
*» 600, 601.

10-9-2. Division of city into zoning districts.
For any or all of said purposes the legislative body may divide the municipality into districts of such number, shape and area as may be deemed best
suited to carry out the purposes of this article, and within such districts it may
regulate and restrict the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration,
repair or use of buildings or structures, or the use of land. All such regulations
shall be uniform for each class or kind of buildings throughout each district,
but the regulations in one district may differ from those in other districts.
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 2; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 15-8-90.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Discretion of governing board.
Fraternity and sorority houses.
Spot zoning.
Discretion of governing board.
By the terms of this section and §§ 10-9-1,
10-9-3 and 10-9-4, the governing body of a city
is granted discretionary power to district and
zone cities for various purposes that are to the
public interest; the exercise of that power will
not be interfered with by the courts unless the
discretion is abused. Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity
v. Salt Lake City, 116 Utah 536, 212 P.2d 177
(1949).
Fraternity and sorority houses.
Ordinance confining the location of fraternity or sorority houses, in restricted residential
districts, to an area not more than 600 feet
from lands and premises occupied by institution to which the fraternity or sorority is incident was valid as against contention that it
was a discrimination against rightful use of
the plaintiffs' premises. Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt Lake City, 116 Utah 536, 212 P.2d
177 (1949).
Spot zoning.
That the statute contemplates a division and

regulation by districts, instead of regulation by
single lots or small groups of lots, is evident.
The regulation of the use of property by lots or
by very small areas is not zoning and docs violence to the purpose and provisions of the statute. It would not, and could not, accomplish the
purpose of the law as set forth in the statute.
Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141
P.2d 704, 149 A.L.R. 282 (1943).
City must zone districts and not by indiscriminate spot zoning, but this requirement
does not necessitate that districts be confined
and rigidly limited to one particular type of
use. Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111,
141 P.2d 704, 149 A.L.R. 282 (1943).
The cases relative to "spot zoning" are generally cases where a particular small tract
within a large district is specially zoned so as
to impose upon it restrictions not imposed upon
the surrounding lands, or grant to it special
privileges not granted generally, not done in
pursuance of any general or comprehensive
plan. Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah
111, 141 P.2d 704, 149 A.L.R. 282 (1943).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning § 32
et seq.
C.J.S. — 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning §§ 40 to 42.
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10-9-2.5. Residential facility for handicapped persons permitted in municipal zoning district — Conditions
for qualification.
A residential facility for handicapped persons shall be permitted m any
municipal zoning district, subject to the conditional review process, except a
district zoned to permit, exclusively, single family dwelling use, if the facility
conforms to all applicable health, safety, and building codes and is capable of
use as a residential facility for handicapped persons without structural alteration which would change the residential character of the structure For purposes of this section "zoned to permit exclusively single family dwelling use"
means that the applicable ordinance prohibits the occupancy of a housing
structure by any more than one family
A municipality, by ordinance, may provide that no residential facility for
handicapped persons may be established or maintained within one mile of
another existing facility
The use granted and permitted by this section is nontransferable and terminates if the structure is devoted to a use other than as a residential facility for
handicapped peisons or, if the structure fails to comply with applicable
health, safety, and building codes
The governing body of each municipality under locally adopted criteria
shall adopt zoning ordinances which permit, through the grant of conditional
use permits, the establishment and maintenance of residential facilities for
handicapped persons within districts zoned to permit exclusively single family
dwelling use Such ordinances may require that no residential facility for
handicapped persons be established or maintained within one mile of another
existing facility Those ordinances shall prohibit discrimination against residential facilities for handicapped persons.
No person who is being treated for alcoholism or drug abuse shall be placed
in a residential facility for handicapped persons. Placement shall be on a
strictly voluntary basis and shall not be a part of or in lieu of confinement,
rehabilitation, or treatment in a custodial or correctional type institution.
For purposes of this section, "residential facility for handicapped persons'
means a single-family dwelling structure that is occupied on a 24-hour per
day basis by eight or less handicapped persons in a family-type arrangement
under the supervision of house parents or a manager The facility shall be
operated or licensed and regulated by a state agency and if not so operated,
licensed, or regulated, it shall comply with all state standards for group home
operations
For purposes of this section, "handicapped person" means a person who is
nonviolent and who has a severe, chronic disability attributable to a mental or
physical impairment or to a combination of mental and physical impairments
which is likely to continue indefinitely and which results in a substantial
functional limitation in three or more of the following areas of major life
activity self-care, receptive and expressive language, learning, mobility, selfdirection, capacity for independent living, economic self-sufficiency, and who
requires a combination or sequence of special interdisciplinary or generic
care, treatment, or other services that are individually planned and coordinated to allow the person to function in, and contribute to, a residential neighborhood
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History: C. 1953, 10-9-2.5, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 51, § 1; L. 1985, ch. 105, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendment substituted "and is capable of use as a
residential facility for handicapped persons
without structural alteration which would
change the residential character of the structure" for "and if it is capable of use as such a
facility without structural alteration that
changes the residential character of the struc-

ture in which the facility is housed" in the first
paragraph; in the third paragraph, deleted "in
which the facility is housed" preceding "is devoted to" and inserted "a" preceding "use";
added the last sentence to the fourth paragraph; deieted "mental illness" following "alcoholism" in the fifth paragraph; inserted "who is
nonviolent and" after "means a person" in the
last paragraph; and made several minor
punctuation changes.

10-9-3. Regulations to be in accordance with comprehensive plan.
Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan
designed to lessen congestion in the streets, to secure safety from fire, panic
and other dangers, to promote health and the general welfare, to encourage
energy-efficient patterns of development, the use of energy conservation, solar, and renewable energy sources, and to assure access to sunlight for solar
energy devices, to provide adequate light and air, to prevent the overcrowding
of land, to avoid undue concentration of population, to facilitate adequate
provision for transportation, water, sewage, schools, parks and other public
requirements. Such regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration,
among other things, to the character of the district and its peculiar suitability
for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value of buildings and
encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout the city.
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 3; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 15-8-91; L. 1981, ch. 44, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amendment inserted "to encourage energy-efficient

patterns of development, the use of energy conservation, solar, and renewable energy sources,
and to assure access to sunlight for solar
energy devices" in the first sentence.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
—Comprehensive zoning.
—Fraternity and sorority houses.
Discretion of governing board.
Purposes of zoning.
Subdivisions.
Constitutionality.
—Comprehensive zoning.
Comprehensive zoning plans ore valid. Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d
704, 149 A.L.R. 282 (1943).
—Fraternity and sorority houses.
Ordinance confining the location of fraternity or sorority houses, in restricted residential
district, to an area not more than 600 feet from
the lands and premises occupied by the institution to which the fraternity or sorority is inci-

dent was valid as against contention that it
was a discrimination against the rightful use
of the plaintiffs' premises. Phi Kappa loin Fraternity v. Salt Lake City, 116 Utah 53(5, 212
P.2d 177 (1949).
Discretion of governing board.
By the terms of this section and §§ 10-9-1
and 10-9-4, the governing body of a city is
granted discretionary power to district and
zone cities for various purposes that are to the
public interest; the exercise of that power will
not be interfered with by the courts unless the
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discretion is abused. Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity
v. Salt Lake City, 116 Utah 536, 212 P.2d 177
(1949).
Purposes of zoning.
The purposes which control and must be subserved by any zoning are set forth in this section. The elements required of a zoning plan
are: It must be comprehensive; it must be designed to protect the health, safety, and morals
of the inhabitants; promote the general welfare; avoid overcrowding and congestion in
traffic and population; facilitate transportation
and other public service; and meet the ordinary
or common requirements of happy, convenient

10-9-3.6

and comfortable living by the inhabitants of
the districts and the city as a whole. Marshall
v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704,
149 A.L.R. 282 (1943).
Subdivisions.
A city ordinance requiring subdividers to
dedicate 7 percent of the subdivision's land to
the city, or pay the equivalent of that value in
cash for flood control and/or parks and recreation facilities was within the scope of authority and responsibility of the city government in
the promotion of the health, safety, morals and
general welfare of the community. Call v. City
of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning § 27.
C.J.S.—101AC.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning § 39.
A.L.R. — Mandamus to compel zoning offi-

cials to cancel permit granted in violation of
zoning regulation, 68 A.L.R.3d 166.
Key Numbers. — Zoning «=» 30.

10-9-3.5. Regulation of subdivision development plans to
protect access to sunlight for solar energy.
The legislative body, in order to protect and assure access to sunlight for
solar energy devices, may adopt regulations governing subdivision development plans that relate to the use of restrictive convenants [covenants] or solar
easements, height restrictions, side yard and setback requirements, street and
building orientation and width requirements, height and location of vegetation with respect to property boundary lines and other permissible forms of
land use controls.
History: C. 1953, 10-9-3.5, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 44, § 3.

Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed word
"covenants" was inserted by the compiler.

10-9-3.6. Disapproval of plats or agreements which prohibit solar or other energy devices.
The legislative body may refuse to approve or renew any plat or subdivision
plan, or the dedication of any street or other ground, if the deed restrictions,
convenants [covenants] or similar binding agreements running with the land
for the lots or parcel covered by the plat or subdivision prohibit or have the
effect of prohibiting reasonably sited and designed solar collectors,
clotheslines or other energy devices based on renewable resources from being
installed on buildings erected on lots or parcels covered by the plat or subdivision.
History: C. 1953, 10-9-3.6, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 44, § 4.

Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed word
"covenants" was inserted by the compiler.

307

10-9-4

CITIES AND TOWNS

10-9-4. Planning commission — Zoning plan, ordinance,
maps and recommendations — Certification to
legislative body — Zoning of municipality.
In order to more fully avail itself of the powers conferred by this chapter to
the mayor, with the advice and consent of the legislative body, may appoint a
commission to be known as the planning commission. The planning commission, through its own initiative may, or by order of the legislative body of the
municipality shall, make and certify to the legislative body a zoning plan,
including both the full text of the zoning ordinance and maps, and representing the planning commission's recommendations for zoning the municipality.
The legislative body may, after receiving the recommendations of the planning commission for the zoning of the municipality, divide the municipality
into districts or zones of such number, shape, and area as it may determine,
and within such districts may regulate the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, and uses of buildings and structures, and the uses of land.
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 4; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943,15-8-92; L. 1949, ch. 15, § 1; 1983, ch.
33, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amendment substituted "the mayor, with the advice

and consent of the legislative body" for "such
legislative body".
Cross-References. — Municipal Planning
Enabling Act and planning commissions thereunder, § 10-9-19 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Discretion of city council.
Fraternity and sorority houses.
Spot zoning.
Discretion of city council.
The discretion of the governing body of a city
is very extensive with regard to the wisdom of
the plan, the necessity for the zoning, the number and the nature of the districts to be created, the boundaries thereof and the uses permitted therein. It is the primary duty of the
city to make the classifications. If a classification is reasonably doubtful, the judgment of
the court will not be substituted for the judgment of the city. In short, unless the action of
the governing body of the city is arbitrary, discriminatory or unreasonable, or clearly offends
some provision of the Constitution or another
statute, the court must uphold it, if it is within
the municipality's grant of power. Marshall v.
Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704,
149 A.L.R. 282 (1943),
By the terms of this section and §§ 10-9-1 to
10-9-3, the governing body of a city is granted
discretionary power to district and zone cities
for various purposes that are to the public interest; the exercise of that power will not be
interfered with by the courts unless the discretion is abused. Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v.

Salt Lake City, 116 Utah 536, 212 f\2d 177
(1949).
Fraternity and sorority houses.
Ordinance confining the location of fraternity or sorority houses, in restricted residential
district, to an area not more than 600 feet from
the lands and premises occupied by institution
to which the fraternity or sorority is incident
was valid as against contention that it was a
discrimination against the rightful use of the
plaintiffs' premises. Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity
v. SaU Lake City, 116 Utah 536, 212 P.2d 117
(1949).
Spot zoning.
Zoning ordinances, to the extent that they
provided for small spot Residential "C" or Residential "B3" districts, did not violate requirement of comprehensive zoning plan. Provisions
creating very small areas for limited business
purposes detached from "C" or "B3" districts
were not objectionable as "spot zoning," or as
offending against the rule that zoning must be
by districts. Marshall v. Salt Lake City. 105
Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704,149 A.L.R. 282 (1943).
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10-9-5. Zoning ordinances — Procedures — Assigning
zones to territory annexed to the territory.
(1) No zoning ordinance, map, or amendment thereto may be adopted until
the legislative body has given at least 15 days published notice of the time,
place, and purpose at which the zoning ordinance, map, or amendment is to be
considered and public comment heard.
(2) No zoning ordinance, map, or amendment may be adopted by the legislative body unless the planning commission has reviewed and made recommendations to the legislative body regarding that ordinance, map, or amendment.
(3) The planning commission shall have 30 days to respond to any request
from the legislative body for recommendation and if none is received within
30 days after the request is made to the chair of the planning commission, the
legislative body may adopt the zoning ordinance, map, or amendment in the
manner required by Subsection (2).
(4) The legislative body may assign a zone to territory annexed to the municipality at the time the territory is annexed.
(5) If a municipality does not have a zoning ordinance which shows a zone
for territory to be annexed to the municipality, or if the legislative body does
not assign a zone to territory at the time it is annexed, territory annexed to a
municipality shall be zoned according to the zone of the annexing municipality with which it has the most common boundary.
History: C. 1953, 10-9-5, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 87, § 1.
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985,
ch. 87, § 1 repealed former § 10-9-5 (L. 1925,

ch. 119, § 5; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 15-8-93; L.
1949, ch. 15, § 1), relating to the enactment of
zoning ordinance, and enacted the present
§ 10-9-5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Failure to follow procedural requirements.
—Rights of property owners.
Notice of hearing.
Failure to follow procedural requirements.
—Rights of property owners.
Inasmuch as a zoning ordinance classifying
certain property as residential was void for
want of compliance with mandatory notice and
hearing requirements, the property intended to
be affected thereby was unzoned. The court, in
a suit by certain affected property owners, was
limited to the remedy of declaring the ordinance void and to providing injunctive relief
against the city, entitling the property owners
to use or sell their property for a restaurant or
a similar use, as they desired. The court erred
in declaring the ordinance void, but denying
injunctive relief, on the ground that the
owners, proposed use of their property would

not have been in the "public interest." Carter
v. City of Salina, 773 F.2d 251 (10th Cir. 1985).
Notice of hearing.
Zoning ordinance was not invalid for failure
of the commission to give proper notice where
the required fifteen-days notice stated the requested change was from "Residential R-6" to
"Commercial C-3," and the change eventually
made by the commission was to "Business
B-3," since everything allowed by a "Business
B-3" classification was included within the
more comprehensive "Commercial C-3," and
those complaining of lack of proper notice had
actual notice and participated in the hearing.
Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 17 Utah 2d
300, 410 P.2d 764 (1966).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Note, Urban Planning and Development — Race and Poverty —
Past, Present and Future, 1971 Utah L Rev
46
Am. J u r . 2d. — 58 Am Jur 2d Zoning
§§ 10, 169 et seq
C.J.S. — 62 C J S Municipal Corporations
* 226, 101A C J S Zoning and Land Planning
^ 12 to 15, 65 et seq

A.L.R. — Validity and construction of provisions of zoning statute or ordinance regarding
protest by neighbonng property owners, 7
A L R 4th 732
Key Numbers. — Municipal Corporations
«=» 601 1, Zoning «=» 15, 193 to 195, 359

10-9-6. Board of adjustment — Appointment — Limitation
on exercise of powers as to restrictions on use of
property — Exemption from operation of ordinance.
In order to avail itself of the powers provided in this chapter the mayor,
with the advice and consent of the legislative body, shall appoint a board of
adjustment, and in the regulations and restrictions adopted pursuant to authority under this chapter shall provide that the powers by this chapter given
shall not be exeicised so as to deprive the owner of any property of its use for
the purpose to which it is then lawfully devoted, and any ordinance enacted
under authority of this chapter shall exempt from the operation thereof any
building or structure as to which satisfactory proof shall be presented to the
boaid of adjustments provided for in this chapter that the present or proposed
situation of such building or structure is reasonably necessary for the convenience or welfare of the public
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 7; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 15-8-95; L. 1949, ch. 15, § 1; 1983, ch.
33, $ 6.
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend-

ment substituted "chapter" for "article"
throughout the section, inserted "the mayor,
with the advice and consent of", and made a
minor change in phraseology

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Prior nonconforming use
Rules and regulations
Prior nonconforming use.
Excavation of sand and gravel was valid
nonconforming use and could not be enjoined
under zoning ordinance proscribing such use
since gravel operation had been conducted
prior to the enactment of the ordinance, nature
of extractive business contemplated continuance of use over entire paicel of land without
rcslnclion to immediate aica excavutcd at the
time the ordinance was passed, and nonconforming status was not lost because ownership

of land had changed since enactment of ordinance Gibbons & Reed Co v North Salt Lake
City, 19 Utah 2d 329, 431 P 2d 559 (1967)
Rules and regulations.
The board may make such rules and regulations as are reasonably necessary or expedient
to enable it to carry out its administrative
functions and duties, but not the duties and
poweis of the commission Walton v Traty
Loan & Trust Co, 97 Utah 249, 92 P 2d 724
(1939)
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning
§ 194 et seq.
C.J.S. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations
§ 227 (2).
A.L.R. — Construction and application of
statute or ordinance requiring notice as prerequisite to granting variance or exception to
zoning requirement, 38 A.L.R.3d 167.
Authority of zoning commission to impose,
as condition of allowance of special zoning exception, permit, or variance, requirements as
to highway and traffic changes, 49 A.L.R.3d
492.

Zoning board's grant of new application for
zoning change, variance, or special exception
after denial of previous application covering
same property or part thereof, 52 A.L.R 3d 4!M.
Classification and maintenance of advertising structures as nonconforming use, 80
A.L.R.3d 630.
Building in course of construction as establishing valid nonconforming use or vested
right to complete construction for intended use,
89 A.L.R.3d 1051.
Key Numbers. — Municipal Corporations
«=» 601.1; Zoning <s=> 352, 354.

10-9-7. Board — Number of members — Alternate members — Appointment — Term — Removal — Vacancies.
The board of adjustment shall consist of five members, and such alternate
members as the mayor with the advice and consent of the governing body
deems appropriate, each to be appointed by the mayor with the advice and
consent of the governing body for a term of five years but the terms of the
members of the first board so appointed shall be such that the term of one
member shall expire each year. Alternate members shall serve in the absence
of a member or members of the board of adjustment under rules established by
the governing body. No more than two alternate members shall sit at any
meeting of the board at one time. Any member may be removed for cause by
the governing body upon written charges and after public hearing, if such
public hearing is requested by the member. Vacancies shall be filled for the
unexpired term of any member or alternate member whose office becomes
vacant. One member, but not more than one, of the planning commission shall
be a member of the board of adjustment.
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 7; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943,15-8-96; L. 1949, ch. 15, § 1; 1983, ch.
31, § 1; 1983, ch. 33, § 7.
Amendment Notes. — This section was
amended twice in 1983, by chapter 31 and by
chapter 33. Neither act referred to the other.
The section is printed incorporating the
changes made by both amendments.
The 1983 amendment by chapter 31 inserted
"and such alternate members as the mayor
with the advice and consent of the governing
body deems appropriate" in the first sentence;

substituted "governing body for a term" in the
first sentence for "legislative body for a term";
inserted the second and third sentences; inserted "or alternate member" in the fifth sentence; and substituted "office" for "term" in the
fifth sentence.
The 1983 amendment by chapter 33 inserted
"mayor with the advice and consent of the" in
the first sentence; added "by the member" in
the fourth sentence; and made minor changes
in phraseology.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning §§ 180 to 182.
Key Numbers. — Zoning «=» 351, 354, 355.
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10-9-8. Organization of board — Meetings — Duties of
members — Zoning administrator — Appointment — Functions — Appeals.
The board of adjustment shall organize and elect a chairman and adopt
rules in accordance with the provisions of any ordinance adopted pursuant to
this article. Meetings of the board shall be held at the call of the chairman and
at such other times as the board may determine. The chairman, or in his
absence the acting chairman, may administer oaths and compel the attendance of witnesses. All meetings of the board shall be open to the public. The
board shall keep minutes of its proceedings, showing the vote of each member
upon each question, or if absent or failing to vote indicating such fact, and
shall keep records of its examinations and other official actions; all of which
shall be immediately filed in the office of the board and shall be a public
record.
The governing body may provide for the appointment of a zoning administrator to decide routine and uncontested matters of the board of adjustment,
as designated by the board, and pursuant to its established guidelines. Any
person iig^rieved by a decision of the zoning administrator may appeal the
decision to the board of adjustment, as provided in this chapter.
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 7; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1913, 15-8-97; L. 1983, ch. 30, § 1.

Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amendment added the second paragraph.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning §§ 183 to 190.
A.L.R. — Disqualification for bias or inter-

est of administrative officer sitting in zoning
proceeding, 10 A.L.R.3d 694.
Key Numbers. — Zoning «» 351-364.

10-9-9. Appeals to board — Time — Persons entitled —
Transmission of papers.
Appeals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any person aggrieved
or by any officer, department, board or bureau of the municipality affected by
any decision of the administrative officer. Such appeal shall be taken within a
reasonable time as provided by the rules of the board by filing with the officer
from whom the appeal is taken and with the board of adjustment a notice of
appeal specifying the grounds thereof. The officer from whom the appeal is
taken shall forthwith transmit to the board of adjustment all the papers constituting the record upon which the action appealed from was taken.
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 7; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 15-8-98.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning
§ 194 et seq.
C.J.S. — 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning §§ 184 to 190.
A.L.R. - Right to cross-examination of witnesses in hearings before administrative
zoning authorities, 27 A.L.R.3d 1304.

Standing of owner of property adjacent to
zoned property, but not within territory of
zoning authority, to attack zoning, 69 A.L.R.3d
gQ5
^ 44L
R
N u m b e r g . _ Zoni
J

&

10-9-10. Stay of proceedings pending appeal.
An appeal stays all proceedings in furtherance of the action appealed from,
unless the officer from whom the appeal is taken certifies to the board of
adjustment after the notice of appeal shall have been filed with him that by
reason of facts stated in the certificate a stay would in his opinion cause
imminent peril to life or property. In such case proceedings shall not be stayed
otherwise than by restraining order which may be granted by the board of
adjustment or by the district court on application and notice and on due cause
shown.
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 7; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 15-8-99.

10-9-11. Notice of hearing of appeal — Right of appearance.
The board of adjustment shall fix a reasonable time for the hearing of the
appeal, give public notice thereof as well as due notice to the parties in interest, and shall decide the same within a reasonable time. Upon the hearing any
party may appear in person or by agent or by attorney.
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 7; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 15-8-100.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning
§§ 221, 222.
C.J.S. — 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning §§ 187, 188, 215.
A.L.R. — Construction and application of

statute or ordinance requiring notice as prerequisite to granting variance or exception to
zoning requirement, 38 A.L.R.3d 167.
Key Numbers. — Zoning «=» 442, 443.

10-9-12. Powers of board on appeal — Granting of and
showing to be entitled to variance.
The board of adjustment shall have the following powers:
(1) to hear and decide appeals where it is alleged that there is error in
any order, requirement, decision or determination made by the administrative official in the enforcement of this article or of any ordinance
adopted pursuant thereto;
(2) to hear and decide special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance
upon which such board is required to pass under such ordinance;
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(3) to authorize upon appeal such variance from the terms of the ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest, where owing to special conditions a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance
will result in unnecessary hardship; provided, that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed and substantial justice done. Before any variance
may be authorized, however, it shall be shown that:
(a) the variance will not substantially affect the comprehensive
plan of zoning in the city and that adherence to the strict letter of the
ordinance will cause difficulties and hardships, the imposition of
which upon the petitioner is unnecessary in order to carry out the
general purpose of the plan;
(b) special circumstances attached to the property covered by the
application which do not generally apply to the other property in the
same district;
(c) that because of said special circumstances, property covered by
application is deprived of privileges possessed by other properties in
the same district; and that the granting of the variance is essential to
the enjoyment of a substantial property right possessed by other
property in the same district.
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 7; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 15-8-101; L. 1949, ch. 15, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Filling stations.
Rules and regulations.
Showing required for variance.
Variations allowed.
Filling stations.
Neither the board nor the district court had
the power to permit or authorize the use of
property for a filling station, which use was at
variance with the use set out in the building
ordinance. Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co.,
97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724 (1939).
Rules and regulations.
The board may make such rules and regulations as are reasonably necessary or expedient
to enable it to carry out administratively its
functions and duties, but not the duties and
powers of the commission. Walton v. Tracy
Loan & Trust Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724
(1939).

variance was not granted; and that substantial
property rights enjoyed by other property in
the area would be denied. Xanthos v. Board of
Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984).
What must be shown by an applicant for a
variance is that the property itself contains
some special circumstances that relate to the
hardship complained of and that the granting a
variance to take this into account would not
substantially affect the zoning plan; it is not
enough to show that the property for which the
variance is requested is different in some way
from the surrounding property. Xanthos v.
Board of Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032 (Utah
1984).

Showing required for variance.
In order to justify a variance, this section
requires that an applicant show at a minimum
that variance would not substantially affect
the comprehensive zoning plan; that there are
special conditions with regard to the property;
that unnecessary hardship would result if the

Variations allowed.
Powers of board are limited to minor and
practical difficulties, to such variations in detail and construction as the inspector himself
might have allowed, rather than to changes in
use. Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 97
Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724 (1939).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning
§ 194 et seq.
C.J.S. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations
§ 227 (10 to 14); 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land
Planning §§ 214, 216.

A.L.R. — Requirement that zoning vnriances or exceptions be made in accordance with
comprehensive plan, 40 A.L.R.3d 372.
Key Numbers. — Municipal Corporations
«*=» 601 to 601.3; Zoning «=» 441, 481 et seq.

10-9-13. Decision on appeal.
In exercising the above-mentioned powers such board may in conformity
with the provisions of this article reverse or affirm, wholly or partly, or may
modify the order, requirement, decision or determination appealed from and
may make such order, requirement, decision or determination as ought to be
made, and to that end shall have all the powers of the officer from whom the
appeal is taken.
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 7; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 15-8-102.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Powers of board generally.
Combining this section with preceding one,
it seems that the powers of the board are the
same as those of the inspector, and that in

passing on appeals the board may do only that
which the inspector could have done in the first
instance. Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 97
Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724 (1939).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 82 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning
§ 314.
C.J.S. — 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning §§ 189, 211.

Key Numbers. — Zoning <*=> 445.

10-9-14. Vote necessary for reversal.
The concurring vote of three members of the board shall be necessary to
reverse any order, requirement or determination of any such administrative
official, or to decide in favor of the appellant on any matter upon which it is
required to pass under any such ordinance, or to effect any variation in such
ordinance.
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 7; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 15-8-103.

10-9-15. Judicial review of board's decision — Time limitation.
The city or any person aggrieved by any decision of the board of adjustment
may have and maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom in any court of
competent jurisdiction; provided, petition for such relief is presented to the
court within thirty days after the filing of such decision in the office of the
board.
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History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 7, R.S. 1933 &
C 1943, 15-8-104; L. 1949, ch. 15, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Effect of failure to appeal
Mandamus
Stope oi judicial review
Effect of failure to appeal.
failure of defendants to appeal from decision
of board of adjustment denying them right to
consti uct and operate funeral home in residential district would not prevent them from setting up defense that ordinance was arbitrary
and unreasonable, since board of adjustment
had no authority itself to rezone Provo City v
Claudin, 91 Utah 60, 63 P 2d 570 (1936)
Defendants, who were enjoined from operating funeral home in residential district established by ordinance, could not set up defense
that oidmance was arbitrary and unreasonable
because district included territory that was
commuual, where matter was never called to
attention of proper city commission and statute
piovidid right of appeal horn decision of such
commission Provo City v Claudin, 91 Utah
60 bJ P2d 570 (19 lb)

Mandamus.
Mandamus was not available to compel issuance of building permit to applicant who ignored right to relief under this section Crist v
Mapleton City, 28 Utah 2d 7, 497 P 2d 633
(1972)
Scope of judicial review.
Role of district court in reviewing board of
adjustment's decision is not to conduct a trial
de novo, but to determine whether board's action was so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and
capricious, however, in making that determination, district court may take additional evidence, but it must be relevant to issues that
were raised and considered by board Xanthos
v Board of Adjustment, 685 P 2d 1032 (Utah
1984)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am J u r . 2d. — 58 Am Jur 2d Zoning
§ 229 et seq
C.J S. — 62 C J S Municipal Corporations
§ 228, 101A C J S Zoning and Land Planning
§ 265 et seq
A.L.R. — Purchaser of real property as precluded from attacking validity of zoning regulation existing at the time of the purchase and
affecting the purchased property, 17 A L R 3d
743

10-9-16.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Section 10-9-16 (L 1925, ch
119 U , R S 1933 & C 1943, 15-8-105), relating to the power of cities to enjoin ordinance

10-9-17.

Standing of owner of property adjacent to
zoned property, but not within territory of
zoning authority, to attack zoning, 69 A L R 3d
805
Standing of zoning board of appeals for similar body to appeal reversal of its decision, 13
A L R 4 t h 1130
Key Numbers. — Municipal Corporations
«=» 601 3, Zoning «=» 561 et seq

violations, was repealed by Laws 1983, ch 37,
§ 5

Conflict of laws.

Whenever the regulations made under authority of this article require a
greater width or size of yards, courts or other open spaces, or require a lower
height of building or less number of stories, or require a greater percentage of
lot to be left unoccupied, or impose other higher standards than are required
in any other btatute or local ordinance or regulation, the provisions of the
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regulations made under authority of this article shall govern. Wherever the
provisions of any other statute or local ordinance or regulation require a
greater width or size of yards, courts or other open spaces, or require a lower
height of building or a less number of stories, or require a greater percentage
of lot to be left unoccupied, or impose other higher standards than are required by the regulations made under authority of this article, the provisions
of such statute, or local ordinance or regulation shall govern.
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 9; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 15-8-106.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Conflict between orders of board of adjustment and ordinance.
Neither the board nor the district court had
the power to permit or authorize the use of

property for a filling station, which use was at
variance with the use set out in the building
ordinance. Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co.,
97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724 (1939).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning § 11.
Key Numbers. — Zoning «=» 14.

10-9-18. Fixing compensation of members of board — Enforcement of zoning regulations — Building inspector and permits — Temporary regulations affecting commercial, industrial or residential
structures.
The legislative body may:
(a) fix per diem compensation for the members of the board of adjustment, based on necessary and reasonable expenses and on meetings actually attended.
(b) provide for the enforcement of zoning regulations including the
withholding of building permits.
(c) create the office of building inspector and appoint a competent person to fill such office.
(d) fix the compensation of building inspector.
(e) provide by ordinance that it shall be unlawful to erect, construct,
reconstruct, alter, or change the use of any building or other structure
within the municipality covered by such zoning regulations without obtaining a building permit from such building inspector.
(f) provide by ordinance that the building inspector shall not issue any
permit unless the plans of and for the proposed erection, or construction,
or use fully conform to all zoning regulations then in effect.
(g) promulgate by ordinance regulations of a temporary nature prohibiting or regulating the erection, construction, reconstruction or alteration
of any building or structure or to be used for any commercial or industrial
purpose or the use of land for any such purpose, and establishing the
minimum front, side and rear yard requirements for the erection and
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alteration of residential buildings or structures which shall be in effect
throughout the municipality for a period not to exceed six months.
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 10; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 15-8-107; L. 1949, ch. 15, § 1.

ARTICLE 2
MUNICIPAL PLANNING ENABLING ACT
10-9-19. Planning commission — Number, terms, appointment of members — Compensation and expenses
— Powers of commission — Appointive powers —
Contractual powers.
Each city and town may have a planning commission, the number and
terms of the members, mode of appointment and other details relating to the
organization and procedure of which shall be determined by the legislative
body of the municipality. The members of the planning commission shall
serve without compensation, except for reasonable expenses. The planning
commission may appoint such employees and staff as it may deem necessary
for its work, and may contract with city planners and other consultants for
such services as it requires, provided the expenditures of the commission shall
be not in excess of such sums as may be appropriated by the legislative body of
the municipality and/or be placed at the disposal of the planning commission
through gift or otherwise.
History: L. 1945, ch. 23, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 15-13-1; L. 1953, ch. 19, § 1.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Note: City Planning
— The Architect's Path Through the Legal
Thicket, 9 Utah L. Rev. 664.
Financing Community Impacts: Local Planning Issues in Ski Resort Development, 1985
Utah L. Rev. 783.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Zoning § 6.
C.J.S. — 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Use
§§ 177 to 179
Numbers. - Zoning *> 351 to 353.
K

10-9-20. Functions and duties of commission — Master
plan — Territory outside city limits.
It shall be the function and duty of the planning commission, after holding
public hearings, to make and adopt and certify to the legislative body, a
master plan for the physical development of the municipality, including any
areas outside of its boundaries which, in the commission's judgment, bear
relation to the planning of the municipality. Where the plan involves territory
outside the boundaries of the city, action shall be taken with the concurrence
of the county or other municipal legislative body concerned. The master plan,
with the accompanying maps, plats, charts and descriptive and explanatory
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matter, shall show the planning commission's recommendations for the said
physical development, and may include, among other things, the general location and extent of streets. The planning commission may from time to time
amend, extend or add to the plan or carry any part or subject matter into
greater detail.
History: L. 1945, ch. 23, § 2; C. 1943,
Supp., 15-13-2.

Cross-References.
§§ 10-9-4, 10-9-5.

—

Zoning

plan,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Necessity of referendum.
Subdivisions.
Necessity of referendum.
An ordinance passed by a county council, at
the request of the planning commission, changing the classification of certain property from
residential to commercial use, was an administrative act and not subject to referendum. Bird
v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1,394 P.2d 808 (1964).
Subdivisions.
A city ordinance requiring subdividers to

dedicate 7 percent of the subdivision's land to
the city, or pay the equivalent of that value in
cash for flood control and/or parks and recreation facilities was within the scope of authority and responsibility of the city government in
the promotion of the health, safety, morals and
general welfare of the community Call v. City
of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning § 27.
C.J.S. — 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning §§ 39, 178, 179.

10-9-21.

Key Numbers. — Zoning <§=» 30.

Conformity to master plan required — Effect of
disapproval — Submission to planning commission.

Whenever the legislative authority of the municipality shall have adopted
the master plan of the municipality or any part thereof, then and thenceforth
no street, park or other public way, ground, place or space, no public building
or structure, and no public utility, whether publicly or privately owned, shall
be constructed or authorized until and unless the location and extent thereof
shall conform to said plan or shall have been submitted to and approved by
the planning commission; provided, that in case of disapproval, the commission shall communicate its reasons to the legislative body and such body by a
vote of not less than a majority of its entire membership, shall have the power
to overrule such disapproval, and upon such overruling, the legislative body
or the appropriate board or officer shall have the power to proceed; provided,
however, that if the public way, ground, place, space, building, structure or
utility be one the authorization or financing of which does not, under the law
governing the same, fall within the province of the legislative body, or other
body or official of the municipality, then the submission to the planning commission shall be by the board or official having such jurisdiction, and the
planning commission's disapproval may be overruled by said board by a vote
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of not less than a majority of its entire membership or by said official. The
acceptance, widening, removal, extension, relocation, narrowing, vacation,
abandonment, change of use, acquisition of land for, or sale or lease of any
street or other public way, ground, place, property, or structure, shall be
subject to similar submission and approval, and the failure to approve may be
similarly overruled. The failure of the planning commission to act within
thirty days from and after the date of official submission to it shall be deemed
approval, unless a longer period be granted by the legislative body or other
submitting body, board or official.
History: L. 1945, ch. 23, § 3; C. 1943,
Supp., 15-13-3.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C. J.S. — 101A C J.S. Zoning and Land Planning § 39.
Key Numbers. — Zoning «=> 30.

10-9-22. Powers of commission — Reports and recommendations — Entry upon land.
The planning commission may make reports and recommendations relating
to the plan and development of the municipality to public officials and agencies, other organizations and citizens. It may recommend to the executive or
legislative officials programs for public improvements and the financing
thereof. The planning commission, its members and employees, in the performance of its function, may enter upon any land at reasonable times to make
examinations and surveys and place and maintain necessary monuments and
marks thereon. In general, the planning commission shall have such powers
as may be necessary to enable it to perform its functions and promote municipal planning.
History: L. 1945, ch. 23, § 4; C. 1943,
Supp., 15-13-4.

10-9-23. Major street plan — Official map — Effect of modification.
From and after the time when the planning commission of any municipality
shall have adopted a major street plan, the legislative body may establish an
official map of the whole or any part or parts of the municipality theretofore
existing and established by law as public streets. Such official map may also
show the location of the lines of streets on plats of subdivisions which shall
have been approved by the planning commission. The legislative body may
make, from time to time, other additions to or modifications of the official map
by placing thereon the lines of proposed new streets or street extensions,
widenings, narrowings, or vacations which have been accurately surveyed
and definitely located; provided, however, that before taking any such action
the legislative body shall hold a public hearing thereon and provided, further,
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that such proposed addition to or modification of the official map shall be
submitted to the planning commission for its approval, and in the event of
such commission's disapproval, such addition or modification shall require the
favorable vote of not less than a majority of the entire membership of the
legislative body. The placing of any street or street lines upon the official map
shall not in and of itself constitute or be deemed to constitute the opening or
establishment of any street or the taking or acceptance of any land for street
purposes. Upon adoption of the ordinance creating the official map, the legislative body shall direct that said ordinance be recorded in the office of the
county recorder.
History: L. 1945, ch. 23, § 5; C. 1943,
Supp., 15-13-5.

10-9-24. Building permit — Power of board of adjustment
— Powers of board on appeal — Hearings by
board.
For the purpose of preserving the integrity of the official map, the legislative body may provide by general ordinance that no permit shall be issued for
any building or structure or part thereof on any land located between the
mapped lines of any street as shown on the official map. Any such ordinance
shall provide that the board of adjustment, if the municipality has such a
board, or, if not, that a board of adjustment created for the purpose in such
ordinance, shall have the power, upon an appeal filed with it by the owner of
any such land, to authorize the grant of a permit for a building or structure or
part thereof within any mapped-street location in any case in which the board
of adjustment, upon the evidence, finds (a) that the property of the appellant
of which such mapped-street location forms a part will not yield a reasonable
return to the owner unless such permit be granted, or (b) that, balancing of
interest of the municipality in preserving the integrity of the official map and
the interest of the owner in the use and benefits of the property, the grant of
such permit is required by consideration of justice and equity. Before taking
any such action, the board of adjustment shall hold a public hearing thereon.
In the event that the board of adjustment decides to authorize a building
permit, it shall have the power to specify the exact location, ground area,
height, and other details and conditions of extent and character and also the
duration of the building, structure, or part thereof to be permitted.
History: L. 1945, ch. 23, § 6; C. 1943,
Supp., 15-13-6.
Cross-References. — Appointment, compoBition and powers of board of adjustment,
§§ 10-9-6, 10-9-7, 10-9-12.

Building permits, authority of city to issue,
§ 10-9-18.
Judicial review of decisions of board,
§ 10-9-15.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 82 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning
§ 186 et seq.
C.J.S. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations
§ 227 (1 to 8); 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land
Planning § 191 et seq.

A.L.R. — Mandamus to compel zoning officials to cancel permit granted in violation of
zoning regulation, 68 A.L.R.3d 166.
Key Numbers. — Municipal Corporations
«=» 601 to 601.3; Zoning «=» 371 to 445.
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10-9-25, Adoption of major street plan — Effect on right to
file plat — Approval of planning commission as
condition precedent to filing plat — Regulations
governing subdivision of land.
From and after the time when the planning commission of any municipality
shall have adopted a major street plan and shall have certified the same to the
legislative body, no plat of a subdivision of land lying within the municipality
shall be filed or recorded in the county recorder's office until it shall have been
submitted to and approved by the said planning commission and legislative
body, and such approval entered in writing on the plat by the secretary of the
planning commission and clerk of the legislative body, or other designated
members or employees. No county recorder shall file or record a plat of a
subdivision without such approval, and any county recorder so doing shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. The filing or recording of a plat of a subdivision without such approval shall be void. In exercising the powers granted to
it by the act, the planning commission shall prepare regulations governing
the subdivision of land within the municipality. A public hearing thereon
shall be held by the legislative body, after which the legislative body may
adopt said regulations for the municipality.
History: L. 1945, ch. 23, § 7; C. 1943,
Supp., 15-13-7.
Meaning of "the act". — The phrase "the
act" appearing in this section and §§ 10-9-27 to

10-9-29 apparently refers to Laws 1945, ch. 23,
which enacted this section and §§ 10-9-19 to
10-9-24 and 10-9-26 to 10-9-30.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Approval under council-mayor form of
government.
Under a council-mayor form of government,
approval of a subdivision plat by the mayor
pursuant to an ordinance adopted by the city

council providing for such approval is in com*
pliance with the approval requirements and recording prerequisites of this
section,
Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah
1978).

10-9-26. Transfer or sale of land without prior preparation, approval and recording of subdivision plat
as violation — Exceptions.
Whoever being the owner or agent of the owner of any land located in a
subdivision within any area for which a major street plan has been adopted by
the planning commission and the legislative body, except for land located in a
recorded subdivision, transfers or sells such land without first preparing a
subdivision plat and having such plat approved by said planning commission
and legislative body and recorded in the office of the county recorder shall be
guilty of a violation of this act for each lot so transferred or sold and the
description by metes and bounds in the instrument of transfer or other document used in the process of selling or transferring shall not exempt the transaction from such violation, except that in subdivisions of less than ten lots,
land may be sold by metes and bounds, without necessity of recording a plat if
all of the following conditions are met: (a) The subdivision layout shall have
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been first approved in writing by the planning commission, (b) the subdivision
is not traversed by the mapped lines of a proposed street as shown on the
official map or maps of the municipality, and does not require the dedication
of any land for street or other public purposes, and (c) if the subdivision is
located in a zoned area, each lot in the subdivision meets the frontage, width
and area requirements of the zoning ordinance or has been granted a variance
from such requirements by the board of adjustment.
History: L. 1945, ch. 23, § 8; C. 1943,
Supp., 15-13-8; L. 1953, ch. 19, § 1; 1983, ch.
37, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amendment substituted "violation of this act" for
"misdemeanor"; substituted "such violation"
for "such penalties"; and deleted the last sentence which read: Said municipality may enjoin such transferor sale by action for mjunc-

tion or may recover the said penalty by civil
action."
Meaning of "this act". — The phrase "this
act" first appeared in this section as amended
by Laws 1983, ch. 87, § 1. That act (Laws 1945,
c h # 2 3) also amended §§ 10-9-30, 17-27-21 and
i 7 . 2 7-23. The intended reference, however, apto

b e to t h i g c h

ter

10-9-27. Designation of municipal planning commission —
County or regional planning commission — Expenses of designated commission.
In any municipality other than cities of the first or second class, located in a
county or region which has a planning commission, the legislative body of said
municipality may designate such county or regional planning commission as
the municipal planning commission of said municipality. In acting as the
planning commission of the municipality, the designated county or regional
planning commission shall follow the procedure specified by the provisions of
this act and other laws relating to municipal planning commissions. Any
municipality so designating a county or regional commission as its planning
commission is hereby authorized to and shall pay to the designated planning
commission that portion of the expenses of the designated commission which
is properly chargeable to the said planning service rendered to and for the
said municipality.
History: L. 1945, ch. 23, § 9; C. 1943,
Supp., 15-13-9.

Meaning of "this act". — See the note under this heading following § 10-9-25.

10-9-28. Short title — Definitions.
This act shall be known as "The Municipal Planning Enabling Act." For the
purpose of this act certain terms are defined as provided in this section. Whenever appropriate the singular includes the plural and the plural the singular.
The term "street" includes streets, highways, avenues, boulevards, parkways,
roads, lanes, walks, alleys, viaducts, subways, tunnels, bridges, public easements and rights of way and other ways. The term "subdivision" means the
division of a tract or parcel of land into three or more parts for the purpose,
whether immediate or future, of sale or of building development.
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Supp., 15-13-10; L. 1953, ch. 19, § 1.

10-9-30

Meaning of "this act". — See the note under this heading following § 10-9-25.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Note, Urban Planning and Development — Race and Poverty —

Past, Present and Future, 1971 Utah L. Rev.
46.

10-9-29. Severability clause — Jurisdiction of commission
over public property.
If any section, subsection, sentence, clause or phrase of this act is for any
reason held to be unconstitutional, such decision shall not affect the validity
of the remaining portion of the act. Provided, that nothing contained in this
act shall be construed as giving the planning commission or the legislative
body jurisdiction over properties owned by the state of Utah or the United
States Government.
History: L. 1945, ch. 23, § 11; C. 1943,
Supp., 15-13-11.

Meaning of "this act". — See the note under this heading following § 10-9-25.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 94.
Key Numbers. — Statutes *=» 64(4).

10-9-30, Violation of chapter or ordinance punishable as
misdemeanor — Remedies of municipality and
owners of real estate.
Violation of any of the provisions of Chapter 9, Title 10, or of any adopted
municipal zoning, subdivision, official map, or major street plan ordinance,
shall upon conviction be punishable as a Class C misdemeanor. Said municipality, or any owner of real estate within the municipality in which such
violation occurs, may, in addition to other remedies provided by law, institute
injunctions, mandamus, abatement or any other appropriate action or actions,
proceeding or proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate or remove the unlawful
building, use, or act.
History: L. 1945, ch. 23, § 12; C. 1943,
Supp., 15-13-12; L. 1983, ch. 37, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amendment substituted "Chapter 9, Title 10, or of
any adopted municipal zoning, subdivision, official map, or major street plan ordinance" for
"this act" in the first sentence; inserted "Class
C" in the first sentence; substituted "munici-

pality in which such violation occurs" for "district in which such building, structure or land
is situated" in the second sentence; substituted
"the unlawful building, use, or act" for "such
unlawful erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, maintenance or use" in the
second sentence.
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10-10-1

CITIES AND TOWNS
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 82 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning
§§ 242 to 253.
C.J.S. — 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning §§ 355 to 361.

Key Numbers. — Zoning «^> 761 et seq.

CHAPTER 10
CITIES OF FIRST AND SECOND CLASS
Article 1

Article 3

Municipal Wards

Civil Service Commission

Section
10-10-1. Division of city into wards — Number and boundaries.

Section
10-10-9 to 10-10-22. Repealed,
Article 4
Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures
Act

Budget System
10-10-2 to 10-10-8. Repealed.

10-10-23 to 10-10-75. Repealed.

ARTICLE 1
MUNICIPAL WARDS
10-10-1. Division of city into wards — Number and boundaries.
All cities of the first class shall be divided into six municipal wards and all
cities of the second class shall be divided into five municipal wards, the boundaries of which shall be prescribed by ordinance and shall not be changed
oftener than once in five years; such wards shall be as nearly as may be of
equal population and in compact form.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 181; C.L.
1917, § 532; L. 1939, ch. 26, § 1; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 15-9-1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Redistricting.
This section provides for redistricting, the
city commission being empowered to do so

upon request, as for example, upon the request
of the board of education. Olsen v. Merrill, 78
Utah 453, 5 P.2d 226 (1931).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations
§§ 81, 82.

Key Numbers. — Municipal Corporations
*» 40.
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Chapter 2
ADMINISTRATION AND PROCEDURES
Sections:
11-2-1
11-2-2
11-2-3
11-2-4
11-2-5
11-2-6

Hearings - Notice and Procedure
Amendment - Procedure
Variances - Procedure
Conditional Use Permit - Procedure
Appeals
Annexed Territory - Zoning

11-2-1 HEARINGS - NOTICE AND PROCEDURE, Notices of Public
Hearings required by this Title before the Board of Adjustment,
the Planning Commission, or the City Council shall be given at
least fifteen (15) calendar days before the Hearing in a manner
hereinafter set forth. Such notice shall state the time and place
of such hearings and shall include a general explanation of the
matter to be considered and a general description of the area
affected,
A. If the matter is before the Board of Adjustment, the
Planning Commission, or the City Council, the notice shall
be published at least once in a newspaper of general circulation within Clearfield City,
B. If the matter is before the Board of Adjustment or the
Planning Commission, The City shall, in addition to the above
notice by publication, mail or otherwise deliver a notice to
each owner of property within a radius of three hundred (300)
feet of the exterior boundaries of the subject property, including any property owner(s) outside the corporate limits of
Clearfield City. Such notice shall be headed "NOTICE OF
PUBLIC HEARING," and shall briefly describe the property
involved and the changes, permits, or variances requested.
It shall also state the place, date and time of the hearing.
The list of property owners within three hundred (300) feet
shall be taken from the latest assessment rolls prepared by
the County Assessor of Davis County.
11-2-2 AMENDMENT - PROCEDURE. This Zoning Title, including
ne map, may be amended by the City Council after said amendments
shall have first been submitted for recommendation to the Planning
Commission, The recommendation of the Planning Commission shall be
submitted to the City Council within thirty (30) days after the
presentation of the rezoning proposal or petition for amendment at a
regularly scheduled Planning Commission Meeting.
For the purpose of establishing and maintaining sound, stable,
and desirable development within the City, it is declared to be the
public policy that amendments shall not be made to the Zoning Title,

and Map, except to promote more fully the objectives and purposes
of this Title or to correct manifest errors. Any person seeking
an amendment to the Planning and Zoning Title or Map shall submit
to the Building and Zoning Department a written petition containing
the following information:
A. Designation of the specific zone change or Title
amendment desired.
B. The reason and justification for such zone change or Title
amendment, and a statement setting forth the manner in which
a proposed amendment or Zone would further promote the
objectives and purposes of the Zoning Title.
C. A complete and accurate legal description of the area
proposed to be rezoned, or a draft of the proposed Title
amendment.
D. An accurate plat, drawn to scale, showing all areas to be
included within the proposed rezoning, designating the present
zoning of the property subject of the petition, and properties
immediately adjacent thereto.
E. A list of all property owners within a radius of three
hundred (300) feet of the boundaries of the property to be
rezoned, as taken from the latest assessment rolls prepared
by the County Assessor of Davis County.
F.

A filing fee of $50.00.

Upon receipt of petition by the Building and Zoning Department,
a copy shall be submitted to the office of the City Recorder for
filing, and a copy with all accompanying materials shall be forewarded to the City Planning Commission for their consideration of
the request. The Planning Commission shall hold a public hearing
in accordance with the provisions of Section 11-2-1 of this Chapter
before submitting their recommendations to the City Council.
Before recommending an amendment to this Title, it must be
shown that such amendment is necessary, is in the interest of the
public, and is in harmony with objectives and purposes of this
Title. Failure on the part of the Planning Commission to make
recommendation to the City Council within thirty (30) days after
hearing the petition shall be deemed to constitute approval of
such proposed amendments.
The fee provided herein shall not be returnable and shall be
applied to the General Fund to offset the cost of legal publicationsr
notification of property owners, and the staff time involved in
researching the appropriateness of said request and its effect upon
the general welfare of the community.

11-2-3 VARIANCES - PROCEDURE. The Board of Adjustment may
authorize, upon appeal, such variances from the terms of this Title
as will not be contrary to the public interest, where owing to the
special conditions the literal enforcement of the provisions of
this Title will result in unnecessary hardship; provided, that the
spirit of the Ordinance shall be observed and substantial justice
done. Before any variance may be authorized however, it shall be
shown that:
A. The variance will not substantially affect the comprehensive
plan of zoning in the City and that adherence to the strict
letter of the Ordinance will cause difficulties and hardships,
the imposition of which upon the petitioner is unnecessary in
order to carry out the general purpose of the plan.
B. Special circumstances attached to the property covered by
the application which do not generally apply to other properties in the same district.
C. That because of special circumstances, property covered
by this application is deprived of privileges possessed by
other properties in the same district; and that the granting
of the variance is essential to the enjoyment of a substantial
property right possessed by other property in the same district.
Applications for variance shall be filed with the Secretary
of the Board of Adjustment in the office of the Building and Zoning
Department. Said application shall contain the following information
A. A description of the requested variance, togther with a
designation of that Ordinance Provision from which relief is
being requested.
B. An accurate plot plan, if appropriate, indicating the
manner in which the variance will be applied and its effect
upon adjacent properties.
C.

A filing fee of $50.00.

D. A list of property owners within three hundred (300) feet
of any property subject of the requested variance, contained
within the latest assessment rolls prepared by the County
Assessor of Davis County.
Upon receipt of application by the Secretary of the Board of
Adjustment, a copy shall be submitted to the office of the City
Recorder for filing, and a copy with all accompanying materials
shall be forwarded to the Board of Adjustment for their action upon
the request. The Board of Adjustment shall hold a public hearing
in accordance with procedures set forth in Section 11-2-1 of this
Chapter.

1 I-4.-*t.
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11-2-4.1:

PURPOSE AND INTENT. The purpose and intent of conditional uses
is to allow in certain areas compatible integration of uses which
are related to the permitted uses of the zone, but which may be suitable and
desirable only in certain locations in that zone due to conditions and circumstances peculiar to that location and/or upon certain conditions which make
the uses suitable and/or only if such uses are designed, laid out, and constructed on the proposed site in a particular manner.
11-2-4.2:

CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT. A Conditional Use Permit shall be required
for all uses listed as conditional uses in the zone regulations.
A Conditional Use Permit may be revoked by the City Council after review and
recommendation by the Planning Commission, upon failure to comply with the
conditions imposed with the original approval of the permit.
11-2-4.3:

REVIEW PROCEDURE.

A. Application for a Conditional Use Permit shall be made to the
City Planning Commission accompanied by a filing of $25.00 which fee shall be
non-refundable.
B. Detailed location, site and building plans, the name and address
of all property owners within a three-hundred (300) foot radius of boundaries
of the property shall accompany the complete application on a form provided by
the City.
2
C. All pertinent information shall be mailed to all property
owners within the three-hundred (300) foot radius of the subject property before
review by the Planning Commission. The application together with all pertinent
information will be considered by the Planning Commission at its next regularly
scheduled meeting.
D. The Planning Commission may call a specific Public Hearing on
any application after adequate notice if it is deemed in the public interest,
in which case, the Planning Commission shall take action on the application
by the second meeting of the Planning Commission, after the application filing
date.
11-2-4.4:

DETERMINATION. The Planning Commission may deny or permit a
c o^n d i t ijona 1 _i£S e^ to_ be^l oca ted jy ijthi n ADylzpn^ J. n jvfrich the particular
conditional^iseTis.. permlii3Z.I Irilauthor^^
.use* the Planning
Commission^_shalj impose juch requirements and conditions necessary for the
P r Qt£ctiQn_o.f^adj.ac£nt>Jp r n pp r f fe sT, and. ..pi i hllc^wal f are^
11-2-4.5:

BASIS FOR ISSUANCE OF CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT. The Planning Commission
shall not authorize a Conditional Use Permit unless evidence is
presented to establish:
A.

That thp prnpnspri use, ,nf •tbg,.paxXiaila.r..Tn^tiAaA^,a&C^^4ry

Or desirable to proviriP a ^Prvire

nr far-Mity whirh will rnnfrihiitP tn

fhp

general well-being of the community, and;

An Ordinance to Amend the Revised Ordinances of Clearfield City, 11-2-4-3.B,
Adopted by the City Council, September 22, 1981.
2
An Ordinance Amending the Revised Ordinances of Clearfield City, 11-2-4-3.C,
Adopted by the City Council, September 22, 1981.

D. That such use will not, under the circumstances of the
particular case and the conditions imposed, be detrimental
to the health, safety and general welfare of persons or
injurious to property and improvements in the community,
but will be compatible with and complimentary to the existin.q
surrounding uses, buildings and structures when considering
but not limited to, effect on adjacent property values, traffic,
psf-hpHcs. onllnfion, parking, landscaping, location of
strnrfnrp

nn p a r r p l

and

fiipns.

C. That the proposed use will comply with the regulations
and conditions specified in this Ordinance for such use, and
D. That the proposed use conforms to the goals, policies,
intent and governing principles of the Clearfield City Master
Plan,
11-2-4-6. CONDITIONS WHICH MAY BE IMPOSED INCIDENT TO GRANTING
OF A CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT. Where this Title contains
specific requirements which must be met as an incident of Conditional
Use Permit issuance, all such conditions must be met or adequate
assurance of compliance must be given to the local jurisdiction
prior to the issuance of such permit•
Where no specific requirements are contained in this Title
for the issuance of a Conditional Use Permit, one or more of the
following requirements or limitations may be imposed by the Plannning
Commission as an incident to issuance of such permit.
A. Landscaping to insure compatibility with the intended
characteristics of the district as outlined in this Ordinance.
B. Increased setback and side yard distances from lot lines
may be necessary to insure the public safety and to insure
compatibility with the intended characteristics of the district
as outlined in this Title.
C. The screening of yards or other areas as protection from
obnoxious land uses and activities.
D. The removal of structures, debris, or plant life, incompatible with the intended characteristics of the district outlined
in this Ordinance.
E. The relocation, covering or fencing of irrigation ditches,
drainage channels, and similar potential attractive nuisances
as determined by the Planning Commission.
F. The relocation of proposed or existing structures as
necessary to provide for future streets on the major street plan
of the local jurisdiction, adequate sight distances for general

safety, ground water control, or similar problems,
G. Construction of water mains, sewer mains, and drainage
facilities serving the proposed use, in sizes necessary to
protect existing utility users in the district and to provide
for an orderly development of land in the local jurisdiction.
H. The location, arrangement, and dimensions of truck loading
and unloading facilities•
I. The number, location, color, size, height, lighting, and
landscaping of outdoor advertising signs and structures in
relation to the creation of traffic hazards and"appearance
and harmony with adjacent development.
J. The location, height, and materials of walls, fences,
hedges, and screen plantings to insure harmony with adjacent
development, or to conceal storage areas, utility installations,
or other unsightly development.
K. The planting of ground cover or other surfacing to
prevent dust and erosion.
L.

The retention of existing healthy trees and vegetation.

M. Construction of curbs, gutters, drainage culverts,
sidewalks, streets, fire hydrants, and street lighting which
serve the property in question and which may compensate in
part or in whole for possible adverse impacts to the district
from the proposed conditional use.
N. Restructuring of the land and planting of the same as
directed by the Planning Commission when the conditional use
involves cutting and/or filling the land and where such land
would be adversely affected if not restructured.
0.

Time limits on the validity of the Conditional Use Permit.

P. A bond or other valuable assurance in favor of the local
jurisdiction in an amount to be determined by the governing
body. The amount of said bond or other valuable assurance shall
not exceed the amount calculated by the developer's engineer
and approved by the local engineer as necessary to assure
compliance with all conditions.
Q.

Specific short and long range plans of development.

R. Certification obtained and furnished by the applicant
indicating that the proposed conditional u£e will meet and

comply with standards set by the Environmental Protection
Agency and by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
S. Limitations and/or restrictions on the use and/or location
of uses due to special site conditions including but not
limited to geologically hazardous areas; flood plains;
fault zones; land slide areas; and sensitive areas due to
soil capabilities, wildlife and plant life.
T. Population density and intensity of land uses may be
limited where land capability and/or vicinity relationships
make it appropriate to do so to protect health, safety and
welfare.
U. Provision for or construction of recreational facilities
necessary to satisfy needs of the conditional use.
V. Finish floor elevations and grading plans to prevent or
minimize water damage from flood levels as determined by
hydrology studies.
W. A public hearing when deemed by the Planning Commission
to be in the public interest. However, in the following
instances the holding of a public hearing shall be mandatory:
(1) The Planning Commission determines that existing
streets and thoroughfares are not suitable and adequate
to carry anticipated traffic, and increased densities
resulting from the proposed use may generate traffic in
such amounts as to overload the street network outside
the district.
(2) The Planning Commission determines that increases
in miscellaneous traffic, light, odor, and environmental
pollution generated by the proposed use may significantly
change the intended characteristics of the district as
outlined in this Ordinance.
(3) The Planning Commission determines that the architectural design of the proposed use varies significantly
from the architectural characteristics of the district
(as outlined in this Ordinance) in which such use is
proposed.
(4) There are no specific requirements for the
conditional use in this Ordinance.
X. Any other reasonable condition which will serve to
maintain the intended characteristics of a district as outlined
in this Ordinance and to compensate for possible adverse
impacts to the district from the proposed conditional use.

11-2-4-7. APPEAL. Any person shall have the right to appeal
to the City Council any decision rendered by the Planning Commission
by filing, in writing and in triplicate, the reasons for said
appeal with said City Council at any regular meeting thereof within
fifteen (15) days following the date upon which the decision from
which appeal is being taken is made by the Planning Commission.
A. Notification of Planning Commission. The City Council
shall notify the Planning Commission of the date of said
review in writing at least seven (7) days preceeding said
date set for hearing so that said Planning Commission may
prepare the record for said hearing.
B. Determination of City Council. The City Council, after
proper review of the decision of the Planning Commission, may
affirm, reverse, alter or remand for further review and consideration any action taken by said Planning Commission and
shall make such decision within thirty (30) days of the hearing
of the appeal.
11-2-4-8. BUILDING PERMIT. Following the issuance of a
Conditional Use Permit, the Building Inspector shall review the
permit and the conditions attached. Based on this review and
compliance with any other items that might develop in the pursuance
of his duties, the Building Inspector any approve an application
for a Building Permit and shall insure that development is undertaken
and completed in compliance with said Conditional Use Permit and
Building Permit.
11-2-4-9. EXPIRATION. Unless there is substantial action
under a Conditional Use Permit within a period of one year of its
issuance, the Conditional Use Permit shall expire. The Planning
Commission may grant a single extension not to exceed six months
under exceptional circumstances.
11-2-4-10. MODIFICATION OR REVOCATION OF CONDITIONAL USE PERMITS.
The City Council, on its own motion or by recommendation of
the Planning Commission, may hold a hearing upon the question of
modification or revocation of a Conditional Use Permite granted under
or pursuant to the provisions of this section. Notice of said hearing shall be made in a manner prescribed by Section 11-2-1 of this
Chapter. A Conditional Use Permit may be modified or revoked if the
City Council finds one or more of the following:
1.
That the use is detrimental to the public health, safety,
or welfare or is a nuisance.
o

That the use permit

was obtained by fraud.

3. That the use for which the permit was granted is not
being exercised.
4. That the use for which the use permit was granted has
ceased or has been suspended for six (6) months.
5. That the conditions imposed upon said use permit have
not been complied with.
6. That there is a violation of other laws or ordinances
of the City which have a direct bearing upon the conduct of
the conditional use and/or its compatability with other
surrounding uses.
11-2-5 APPEALS. Appeals from actions or decisions of
Clearfield City Officers, Officials, or Advisory Agencies may be
made in conformance with the following provisions:
A. Appeals to the Board of Adjustment. Appeals to the Board
of Adjustment may be taken by any person aggrieved or by any
Officer, Department, Board of Bureau of Municipality affected
by any decision by the Administrative Officer. Such appeal
shall be taken within fifteen (15) days of said action or
decision by filing a Notice of Appeal with the Officer from
whom the appeal is taken or with the Board of Adjustment.
Said Notice of Appeal shall specify the grounds of the
appeal and circumstances related thereto. The Officer from
whom the appeal was taken shall forthwith transmit to the
Board of Adjustment all papers constituting the record upon
which the action appealed from was taken.
(Ref. Appeals to Board 10-9-9 U.C.A., 1953)
An appeal stays all proceedings in furtherance of the action
appealed from unless the Officer from whom the appeal is taken
certifies to the Board of Adjustment after the Notice of Appeal
shall have been filed with him that by reason of facts stated
in the Certificate a stay would, in his opinion, cause imminent
peril to life or property. In such case, proceedings shall not
be stayed otherwise than by restraining order which may be
granted by the Board of Adjustment or by the District Court
on application and no-cice and on due cause shown.
(Ref. Stay of Proceedings pending appeal 10-9-10
U.C.A., 1953)
The Board of Adjustment shall set a public hearing on the
appeal in accordance with the provisions of Section 11-2-1
of this Chapter. Upon the hearing, any party may appear in
person or by agent or by attorney.
In exercising its powers, the Board of Adjustment may reverse
or affirm, wholly or partly or may modify the order requirement,
decision or determination appealed from and may make such order,
requirement, decision or determination as ought to be made, and
to that end shall have all of the powers of the officer from

whom the appeal is taken. The concurring vote of three (3)
members of the Board shall be necessary to reverse any
order, requirement or determination of any such administrative
official, or to decide in favor of the appellant on any matter
upon which it is required to pass under any such ordinance,
or to affect any variation in such Ordinance•
(Ref. Decision on appeal - vote necessary for reversal
10-9-13 and 10-9-14, U.C.A., 1953)
B. Appeals to the City Council. Appeals to the City Council
may be taken by any person 'aggrieved or affected by any
decision of the City Planning Commission. Such an appeal may
be made within fifteen (15) days of the time of the decision of
the said Planning Commission by filing a notice of appeal with
the office of the City Recorder. The City Recorder shall then
forthwith transmit to the City Council all of the papers and
records related to the action from which the appeal is taken.
The Clearfield City Council shall set a public hearing on the
appeal in accordance with the provisions of Section 11-2-1 of
this Chapter. All persons having any interest in the appeal
may appear in person or be represented at the hearing.
The City Council may confirm or overrule the decision of the
Planning Commission, or may ma^o au^hr^inehdrae-n-ts to thg.
decision as it may de^ui—appropriate.
C. Judig>arr ^Appeal. Any person aggrieved by or affected by
any decision of the Board of Adjustment or the City Council
may have and maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom
in any court of competent jurisdiction; provided, petition
for such relief is presented to the Court within thirty (30)
days after the filing of such decision in the office of the
Board of Adjustment or with the City Recorder.
(Ref. Judicial Review of Board's Decision 10-9-15,
U.C.A., 1953)
11-2-6 ANNEXED i^u^liuxxi - ZUNJLIMU. ^ny property which, for
any reason is not designated on the official zoning map as being
classified in any of the zones established hereby, or any property
in the process of annexation, or annexed to or consolidated to the
City of Clearfield subsequent to the effective date of this Chapter,
shall be deemed to be classified comparably to existing County
Zoning until the same shall have been otherwise classified in the
manner set forth in Section 11-2-2 of this Chapter subsequent to
annexation.
In order to insure due process and to protect the rights of
the citizens of Clearfield City, property shall not be reclassified
to a zone of more intense use concurrently with or prior to
completion of annexation proceedings, unless otherwise requested
by the property owner(s) nor shall any Officer or Official of
Clearfield City utilize reclassification committments as a medium
of bargaining for the annexation of property in Clearfield City.

Chapter 12
P-0 PROFESSIONAL OFFICE ZONE
Sections:
11-12-1
11-12-2
11-12-3
11-12-4
11-12-5
11-12-6
11-12-7
11-12-3
11-12-9
11-12-10
11-12-11
11-12-12
11-12-13
11-12-14
11-12-15

Purpose and Objectives
Permitted Uses
Lot Area
Lot Width
Lot Frontage
Prior Created Lots
Lot Area Per Dwelling
Yard Requirements
Projections into Yard
Building Height
Distance Between Buildings
Permissible Lot Coverage
Parking, Loading and Access
Site Plan Approval
Other Requirements

11-12-1 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES. The Professional Office
(P-O) Zone is established to provide areas in close proximity to
the Central Business District, hospitals, business areas, and
along arterials or major collector streets which will accommodate
mixed multi-family residential uses and offices or laboratories
for professional persons and related uses* This zone should not
be established in a "strip" zoning manner along major streets, but
should be concentrated to provide easy accessibility to the public.
The zone is intended to provide availability of professional services
conveniently to all neighborhoods in the community.
Uses permitted in the P-0 Zone would typically include medium
density apartments, offices for doctors, dentists, accountants,
and other similar professions, medical, and dental laboratories,
and pharmacies.
11-12-2 PERMITTED USES, Those uses or categories of uses
as listed herein, and no others, are permitted in the P-0 Zone.
All uses listed herein are listed by number as designated in
the Standard Land Use Code published and maintained by the Building
and Zoning Department. Specific uses are identified by a fourdigit number in which all digits are whole numbers. Classes or
groupings of such uses permitted in the zone are identified by a
four-digit number in which the last one or two digits are zeros.
All such categories listed herein, and all specific uses contained
within them in the Standard Land Use Code, will be permitted in the
P-0 Zone subject to the limitations set forth herein.
PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

5/

A. Permitted Principal Uses, The following principal
uses and structures, and no others, are permitted in the
P-0 Zone :
USE NO.

USE CLASSFICIATIONS

1141

Apartment (Low-rise, detached) (constructed
to the standards of R-3 Zone provisions)

4 800

Utilities (Lines and rights-of-way only)
(Except 4850)

6311

Advertising Services (Office only)

6320

Consumer Credit Services

63 30

Duplicating, Stenographic and Office Services

6340

Dwelling, Janitorial and Other Building
Services (Office only)

6350

News Syndicate Services (Office Only)

6360

Employment Services

6390

Miscellaneous Business Services (Office only)

6500

Professional Services (Office only - no
lodging or bed facilities)

6710

Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Offices

6900

Miscelleneous Service Organizations (Office
only)
5912
Prescription Pharmacy (Intended for the
convenience of permitted establishments
and/or clients thereof, provided that no
such business occupies more than 15 percent
of the total floor area of the building
in which it is located and has no separate
street entrance.)
B.
Permitted Accessory Uses. Accessory uses and structures
are permitted in the P-0 Zone, provided they are incidental
to, and do not substantially alter the character of the
permitted principal use or structure. Such permitted accessory
uses and structures include, but are not limited to, the
following:
1.

Accessory buildings such as garages, carports,

greenhouses, bath houses, gardening shed, recreation
rooms, and similar structures which are customarily
used in conjection with and are incidental to
principal uses and structures allowed in the P-0 Zone.
2* Swimming pools and incidental bath houses,
3. Storage of materials used for the construction of a
building including a temporary contractor's office
and/or tool shed, provided that such uses are on the
building site or immediately adjacent thereto, and
provided that such use shall be for only the period of
construction and thirty (30) days thereafter.
4. Household pets in residential dwelling units, provided
there shall be no more than one (1) pet over the age
of four (4) months per dwelling unit* Nothing herein
shall be construed as authorizing the keeping of any
animals capable of inflicting harm or discomfort or
endangering the health and safety of any person or
property.
C. Conditional Uses. The following uses and structures are
permitted in the P-0 Zone only after a Conditional Use Permit
has been approved by the Planning Commission, and subject to
the terms and conditions thereof.
USE NO.

USE CLASSIFICATION

1210

Rooming and Boarding Houses

1211

Baching Apartments (in structures devoted
exclusively to that use) (Six (6) tenants
per unit maximum to standards of R-4 Zone.,

4700

Communications

4800

Utilities (except lines and rights-of-way)

6111

Banking and Related Functions

6513

Hospitals

6516

Sanitariums, ^Convalescent, and Rest Home
Services "*
"
" * w*-^

11-12-3 LOT AREA. The minimum lot area of any lot or parcel
of land m the P-0 Zone shall be seven thousand (7,000) square feet.
11-12-4 LOT WIDTH. Each lot or parcel of land in the P-0
Zone shall have a width of not less than seventy (70) feet.
11-12-5 LOT FRONTAGE. Each lot or parcel of land in the
P-0 Zone shall abut a public street for a minimum distance of
fifty (50) feet, on a line parallel to the center line of a street

Vol 14 NolO

AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION
UTAH CHAPTER

SUMMER 1988

STATE'S TOP COURTS OVERRULE
ZONING APPEALS PROCEDURES
With a quick one-two punch, the state's top courts
last month demolished the appeals process used by many
Utah cities in administration of their zoning
ordinances.
In decisions handed down within ten days of each
other, the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of
Appeals said that boards of adjustment, not city
councils, are the bodies authorized by state law to
consider appeals of all zoning actions undertaken by
the Planning Commission.
Zoning ordinances in many Utah cities empower the
Planning Commission to act on such matters as granting
conditional use permits and approving site plans.
Many of these same ordinances allow persons aggrieved
by a zoning action of the Planning Commission to
appeal to the City Council. But the two recent state
court rulings have invalidated the appeals procedure.
In a ruling in Scherbel v. Salt Lake City, handed
down by the Utah Supreme Court on May 3, the Court
addressed the actions of the city Planning Commission
and Landmarks Committee which were appealed to the
City Councfl. The Court wrote, "We disagree with the
trial court's analysis permitting the City Council to
hear appeals of Planning Commission decisions. The
Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act ...
prohibits the City Council from hearing such appeals
because of the separation of powers doctrine. ... (W)e
hold that the ^authority to resolve zoning disputes is
properly an executive function rather than a
legislative one. ... We ... hold that the board of
adjustment is the proper body to hear zoning appeals
from the planning commission under the council-mayor
form of government*
Ten days later, in Davis County v. Clearfield City,
the Utah Court of Appeals specifically addressed an
appeal of a conditional use permit. The Appeals Court
wrote, "...(Clearfield) cit/s ordinance is
^ .

inconsistent with generally applicable state law, at
least insofar as it vests in the city council, rather
than a board of adjustment, the final word on
applications for conditional use permits.
In that
sense, the ordinance is unconstitutional under the
supremacy clause contained in Utah Constitution Art
XI, Par. 5."
The Appeals Court continued, "... the Clearfield City
ordinance ... fails to provide for final review of
zoning matters by a board of adjustment as required by
Par. 10-9-15 (Utah State Code) and endeavors to vest
the City Council with the final determination of
conditional use permits. A legislative body may act
as a board of appeals only when the creation of a
board of adjustment is not statutorily mandated."
Many city zoning ordinances in Utah, and elsewhere,
have adopted zoning procedures that were not
contemplated in the original Standard Zoning Enabling
Act, written in 1925. Such items as conditional use
permits, site plans, historic landmarks committees,
and many others, have evolved since the original Act
was developed.
As these new zoning techniques gained greater
acceptance, planners and city councils generally felt
more comfortable having Planning Commissions and City

Councils, bodies which dealt with planning issues
regularly, conduct the review and approval
Some states have changed the Zoning Enabling Act to
speciGcally authorize these new procedures. But many
others simply acted under the rule that if certain
actions are not specifically prohibited in the state
law, then they are permissible.
As challenges have arisen in other states over the
issuance of conditional use permits and site plan
approvals, various state courts have split on the
allowable procedures. Some upheld the new techniques,
while others overturned them. The Utah courts, until
last month, had been silent on the issue.
In the two recent Utah rulings, the Courts apparently
have no problem with conditional use permits, site
plan approval procedures, or any of the other "new"
techniques employed in zoning ordinances today. Their
main objection is to the appeals process employed in
those ordinances.
Interestingly, the appeals procedures used by Salt
Lake City and Clearfield were not critical to the
outcome of the cases.
Yet the Courts spent
considerable space in addressing what they viewed as
the proper process for appeals.
Scherbel v. Salt
Lake City turned on the question of when vested
rights become established, while the central issue
in Davis County v. Clearfield City waswhether denial
of a conditional use permit was based on supportable
facts.
The rulings have already generated considerable
discussion.
Many planners and city officials are
concerned about having to turn over zoning
administration decisions to their Boards of

Adjustment The Boards in many communities are
generally felt to have Little understanding of the
rules of zoning and their role in administering them.
The Utah League of Cities and Towns is currently
polling its members, anticipating the introduction of
legislation in the 1989 State Legislature to deal with
the issue raised in the court rulings.
Even two of the Utah Supreme Court Justices have
disagreed with the change in appeals procedures.
Justices Howe and Hall, in a concurring and dissenting
opinion in Scherbel v. Salt Lake City, said, "The
Planning Commission is an advisory body to the
Council, Utah Code Ann. Par. 10-9-4 (1986), and hence
the latter reviews actions of the Planning Commission.
The Board of Adjustment has no statutory authority to
review decisions of the Planning Commission. ...
Indeed, one member of the Planning Commission sits on
the Board of Adjustment, which would make any hearing
of an appeal biased."
The Utah APA Legislative Committee plans on working
with the League of Cities and Towns to determine what
course of action, if any, to take with the 1989 State
Legislature on this issue. We would like to hear from
all interested planners, attorneys, and city
officials. Please contact Wilf Sommerkorn, 451-3278,
Ralph Becker, 355-8816, or any member of the Utah APA
Legislative Committee.
The Legislative Committee will also be meeting on July
12 at 11:00 am at 9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000, Salt
Lake City, to discuss its program for the upcoming
year. This issue is sure to be among them. All APA
members interested in this and other legislative
issues are invited to attend. D

zssBHVESTED RIGHTS, ROLE OF PUBLIC COMMENT,!
IDECIDED BY UTAH COURTS!
Several important zoning issues were addressed in
rulings handed down recently by the state's highest
courts, including the question of when rights become
vested, and what the role of public comment is in the
making of zoning decisions.
In Scherbel v. Salt Lake City, the Utah Supreme
Court ruled that an applicant must do more than
simply make an incomplete application to vest
development rights. Meanwhile, the Utah Court of
Appeals, in Davis County v. Clearfield City, said that

public comment cannot be the only reason for approval
or denial of a conditional use permit
Both rulings also stated that the correct procedure
for challenging a zoning decision of the Planning
Commission is to submit an appeal to the Board of
Adjustment, not the City Council (see story on page
i).
In 1979, developer Jack Scherbel applied for approval
of a 35-unit condominium project on the southeast
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corner of 2nd Avenue and E Street in Salt Lake City.
The City Council, in an appeal from an action by the
Planning Commission, turned down the proposal
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In the meantime, acting on petitions submitted by
Avenues area residents, the City Council had rezoned
the area where ScherbePs property was located from
R-6 to R-2A.

In 1984, the Davis County Mental Health Department
applied to Clearfield City for a conditional use
permit to operate a residential treatment program for
adolescents and adults suffering from substance abuse.
The site was located in a commercial zone, but was
adjacent to a residential neighborhood.
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Scherbel filed suit against the city, claiming, among
other things, that he had a vested right to continue
seeking development approval with R-6 densities
because his original application was made while the
property was still zoned R-6.

After several meetings before the Planning Commission
and City Council, Clearfield denied the application.
Residents from the residential neighborhood were in
attendance at most of the meetings, voicing strong
opposition to the proposal.
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The state Supreme Court turned down the developer's
claim, finding that Scherbel's application "did not
comply with the R-6 zoning ordinance requirements then
in effect. His application therefore cannot serve to
vest
any
rights
to
a
particular
zoning
classification."
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"Allowing persons to obtain vested rights under a
zoning ordinance merely by filing preliminary and
incomplete papers would defeat the very purpose of
zoning regulations," the Court said.

The trial court, in considering the reasons for denial
of the conditional use permit, found that there was no
evidence substantiated by facts which would have
justified the denial.
The district court judge
concluded that the only basis he could find for the
denial was the opposition of the neighbors. While
indicating that there is a role for public comment in
zoning decision-making, the judge ruled that public
opposition alone was not an adequate reason for denial
of the permit.
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The issue of when development rights become vested is
handled differently in different states. Some states
do not allow vesting until a building permit has been
issued and construction has actually commenced. Prior
to that time, changes in ordinances would mean a
developer would have to modify his plans to comply
with the new ordinances.
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Other states allow vesting at earlier points in the
development approval process.
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Utah did not have a clear rule on vested rights until
this latest court decision. The state's traditionally
conservative climate has prompted some observers to
quip that a developer in Utah gains a vested right
when he's lying in bed at night dreaming about a new
project.
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Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney Bruce Baird said
that prior to the Scherbel ruling, developers would
hear of potential zoning changes and would then "run
in with some preliminary sketches and claim they had
some vested rights for development. The court clearly
said," however, "they had to have some pretty final
plans that would have met the existing zoning prior to
the change."
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The role of public comment in the making of zoning
decisions was a central issue addressed by the Utah

Court of Appeals in Davis County v. Clearfield City.

The Appeals Court noted that "the trial court was
correct in concluding^ that the offered reasons are
without factual basis in the record. What the court
found to be the real reason for the action, 'public
clamor,' is not an adequate legal basis for the city's
decision."
The Appeals Court even went so far as to cite a recent
Wyoming Supreme Court ruling on a similar issue which
said, "'(t)he opposition of neighbors is not one of
the considerations to be taken into account' when
determining whether to issue a development permit." Q
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